The Symbiotic Circle of Community: A Comparative Investigation of Deviance Control in Intentional Communities by Rothenberg, Zachary
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2001
The Symbiotic Circle of Community: A
Comparative Investigation of Deviance Control in
Intentional Communities
Zachary Rothenberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Anthropology Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zachary Rothenberg, The Symbiotic Circle of Community: A Comparative Investigation of Deviance Control in Intentional Communities, 49
Clev. St. L. Rev. 271 (2001)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
 271 
THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY:  A 
COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF DEVIANCE  
CONTROL IN INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES 
ZACHARY ROTHENBERG1 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 272 
 II. SECTION I............................................................................. 274 
 A. The Oneida Community ............................................... 277 
 1. Brief History......................................................... 277 
 2. Perfectionism........................................................ 278 
 3. Communal Life..................................................... 278 
 4. Isolation ................................................................ 280 
 5. Organizational Structure....................................... 281 
 6. Mutual Criticism................................................... 281 
 7. Summary............................................................... 283 
 B. The Old Order Amish................................................... 284 
 1. Brief History......................................................... 284 
 2. Amish Christianity and Gelassenheit ................... 286 
 3. Communalism....................................................... 286 
 4. Isolation and the Ordnung .................................... 287 
 5. Organizational Structure....................................... 289 
 6. The Meidung......................................................... 291 
 7. Summary............................................................... 292 
 C. Conclusions.................................................................. 293 
 III. SECTION II ........................................................................... 294 
 A. Residential Community Associations........................... 294 
 1. Definition and Brief History................................. 295 
 2. Community Beliefs or Shared Goals? .................. 297 
 3. Communalism....................................................... 299 
 4. Isolation ................................................................ 301 
 5. Organizational Structure....................................... 303 
 6. Enforcement and Litigation.................................. 304 
 7. Summary............................................................... 307 
 IV. SECTION III .......................................................................... 309 
                                                                
1J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001.  I would like to thank Martha Minow for her guidance 
and encouragement in advising on this paper; Patricia Torres, Mike Ng, Sarah Szalavitz, Sam 
Goodstein, John Coletti, and Robert Marko for their constantly challenging friendship; and my 
family for everything else under the sun.  All factual errors, logical flaws or any other 
shortcomings of this article are my own. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
272 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:271 
 A. Harvard College .......................................................... 309 
 1. Background........................................................... 309 
 2. Individualism and Self-Realization ...................... 310 
 3. Communalism....................................................... 311 
 4. Isolation ................................................................ 313 
 5. Organizational Structure....................................... 314 
 6. Administrative Board ........................................... 316 
 7. Summary............................................................... 319 
 V. SECTION IV.......................................................................... 320 
 A. The Dangers and Limits of Community ....................... 320 
 VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................... 323 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a very large circle on a two-dimensional plane.  We will call this circle 
the world.  Imagine within this very large circle millions of other, overlapping 
circles, each a different color, with varying sizes and degrees of intensity, or 
brightness.  Now imagine that each of these many circles is a self-acknowledged 
group of people, bound by some collective identity or commonality of belief or 
purpose.  At the circumference of each circle is a boundary, pushing members 
inwards towards the core, while limiting intrusion from without.  The size of each 
circle is determined by the number of people who feel a part of that group.  The 
brightness of each circle is determined by the intensity with which those people feel 
connected to each other, and the degree to which their identities are formed by 
membership in that group.  No circle is of precisely the same color.  A single circle 
may be as small and bright as a close-knit family; likewise, a circle may be as large 
(and likely dull, or un-bright) as an entire nation, or even the entire world.  A single 
person may simultaneously be in numerous circles of varying brightnesses (thus the 
overlapping), but, one imagines, it would seem there is a finite amount of brightness 
a single person could exude without feeling “over-committed”.  Thus, in the 
aggregate, the more people that belong to numerous circles, the larger and less bright 
those circles become. 
It would seem a bit ridiculous to label each of these circles a community—at 
their least bright, some of these circles might represent people with the same long-
distance telephone service, or who share the same favorite flavor of ice cream.  Yet, 
it is difficult to distinguish a non-community-circle from a circle that would more 
commonly be considered a community.  Is it a matter of size? Of brightness?  Both?  
For now it will suffice to recognize that at some point along the dual continuums of 
size and brightness, these circles become recognizable communities.  Accordingly, 
we might say that each of these circles is a potential community. 
Now, think of this view of the two-dimensional, very large circle, with millions 
of overlapping circles within it, as simply the top layer of a three-dimensional tube.  
Just like the very large circle, each of the smaller circles is just the top of a long tube 
that extends beneath the plane. Turn the plane ninety degrees in your mind, so that 
the tubes are extending sidelong, rather than vertically.  This three-dimensional 
object now shows a continuum of time, and each tube expresses a circle (a potential 
community) as it extends over time.  We will see that the tubes grow and shrink in 
size with the numbers of “members” feeling a belonging to those potential 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
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communities.  And we will see that the brightness of the tubes will increase or 
diminish over time as well.  For example, we could focus in on one particularly large 
tube representing the United States of America:  we could watch it increasingly grow 
in size as this nation’s population has grown, and we could watch its brightness 
increase, for example, with the heightened patriotism of the World Wars, and 
decrease again soon after.  Looking within the U.S.-tube to discover the tube 
representing, for example, the American Jewish community, we could watch as that 
tube increased dramatically in both size and brightness during the 1920s, remaining 
bright for some time as most members of that community lived and worked closely 
together in a small number of urban ghettos, and then beginning to lose its brightness 
over time as members of the community began to assimilate (to expend more and 
more of their tube-brightness on other potential communities).  Likewise, we could 
see the very large, outermost tube (the potential “global community”) grow steadily 
in size and become brighter over the last century, with globalizing improvements in 
transportation and communication. 
Social critics have expressed concern of late that, for example, with global 
communication and transportation at our fingertips, and with increased emphasis on 
the workplace, our tubes, though perhaps having increased in number, have 
diminished in brightness.2  As the brightnesses of the circles are reduced—due to 
both increased circle size and increased overlapping with other circles—the circles 
themselves begin to dissipate.  It is this circle dissipation that leads these critics to 
lament the loss of community in America.  They seem to long for an earlier day, 
where people felt connected to fewer and smaller, but brighter tubes.  They conjure 
images of a small village, separated by miles from any other village, in which a small 
and homogenous group of people lived, worked, played, and prayed together, 
without interference from the outside world.  They seem to suggest that today’s 
cross-section of the community-tube model would reveal much larger and more 
frequently overlapping tubes, each with a far lesser brightness than in cross-sections 
of past eras.  This does not seem like an inaccurate depiction or an unreasonable 
concern.  Yet, I believe that it is at least something of an exaggeration to look at 
today’s cross-section and say that we are without community—that we are “bowling 
alone.” 
It is my belief that there are communities out there—communities that are 
significant in people’s lives.  This paper will attempt to show that the village-style 
communities that these critics have idealized, while in their most literal form perhaps 
not as common, are indeed analogous to the others that they discount from today’s 
America.  I will endeavor to show that, while in many instances their forms and 
functions may have changed, bright circles of community do exist in America.  In 
examining some of these circles, then, my method will be to look both to the core of 
the community and to its outer perimeter.  We shall see, in fact, that these two parts 
of the circle are in a symbiotic relationship, each one both relying on and providing 
for the other.  We shall see how the core values and purposes at the heart of a 
community inform the social control mechanisms at its perimeter.  Likewise, we 
shall see how a community’s social control functions—the two-way street that both 
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AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
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compels conformity within and prevents infiltration and dilution from without—
perpetuates and reaffirms the values and purposes of the community. 
In Section I, I will consider two extreme examples of community (the Oneida 
Community of the 19th Century and the Old Order Amish).  These are communities 
both highly cohesive and highly isolated—they are extremely bright tubes with 
sharply delineated circumferences.  In Section II, I will discuss a more mainstream 
example, Residential Community Associations, which, unlike the communities of 
Part I, represent a much more particular and individualistic notion of community.  
Section III will consider the community of Harvard College students, which forms an 
interesting blend of the tight-knit and life-encompassing nature of the Section I 
communities and the individualistic nature of Residential Community Associations.  
In Section IV, I will briefly explore, in light of the first three sections, the dangers 
and limits of communities, and propose a series of factors that ought to contribute to 
any State decision whether to interfere. 
With each community considered, I will try to paint a picture of the many 
collectivizing factors at work, from the perspective of both the individual members 
(or potential-members) and the community as a whole:  (1) the history or tradition of 
the community; (2) its underlying ideology, belief and value systems, and/or 
common interests or goals; (3) the nature of its communalism; (4) the nature of its 
isolation from the outside world; and (5) its decision-making and governance 
structure.  Finally, I will look to its “gate-keeping” or circumference-drawing 
functions—how the community controls deviance and maintains unity within, while 
distinguishing itself from the chaos without.  I hope with each community to shed 
some light on both its conceptions of “deviance” and the calculus likely at work in 
any individual member’s decision whether to deviate.   Through these several 
juxtapositions of community features, I will show that where there is a collective 
effort to control deviance—to conform behavior to collectively perceived and 
understood norms, and to remove or exclude those whose behavior conflicts with 
these norms—there must also be a community of shared beliefs, values, and/or goals 
feeding, and being fed by, those efforts. 
II.  SECTION I 
The three communities in this first section represent extreme examples of 
community.  Even the most skeptical critic would be hard-pressed to deny that these 
communities are as cohesive, if not more so, than those communities of old that they 
tend to idealize.  It is not at all my intention in this first section to argue the mere 
existence of these communities, for that is no doubt quite obvious.  Rather, this 
section is meant to provide a baseline of comparison for the following two sections.3  
With this goal in mind, it is perhaps useful to generalize briefly about the 
commonalities of these two communities.  In placing these communities within the 
three-dimensional tube-world model described above, both may be envisioned, in 
comparison to other, less extreme communities, as particularly small in diameter, 
extremely bright, highly discrete (with few other community-circles overlapping), 
and having strong perimeter borders.  In other words, these two communities (1) 
include relatively small numbers of people; (2)  include members who feel extremely 
                                                                
3It is for this reason that I feel comfortable including the no-longer-existent Oneida 
Community. 
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connected to each other, and who consider the community an extremely significant 
component of their individual identities; (3) are particularly isolated—physically or 
otherwise—from outsiders; and (4) based on the first three characteristics, have 
strong mechanisms for social control. 
Before proceeding with accounts of these communities, however, a brief 
theoretical interlude seems appropriate.  Throughout this paper, the several 
communities will be compared on a number of levels.  Some—size, location, etc.—
will be quite obvious.  Others—levels of isolation and communalism, underlying 
beliefs and values—will be less obvious.  In examining many of these less obvious 
features, I will often refer to two interconnected distinctions:  (1) the difference 
between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relations, and (2) the difference between 
instrumental, affective, and moral orientations.  The first of the two distinctions 
focuses on types of relations that predominate between community members.4  This 
distinction is a tool for examining the nature of the community as a whole.  The 
paradigmatic example of gemeinschaft relations is a family—“non-rational” relations 
based on emotion and affection.  Gesellschaft is most easily depicted as a 
corporation—“rational” relations based on mutual understanding and external goals.  
No community can exist solely in one of these two realms:  a family cannot live 
peacefully under one roof without deciding who will take out the trash and who will 
do the dishes; likewise, a corporation cannot prosper where there are no positive 
interpersonal relations to bring to the conference table.  But while it may be true that 
any functional community must have both these types of relations, one can compare 
communities and discover that they do not necessarily present the same balance with 
respect to these two types of relations. 
The second comparative spectrum aims to distinguish instrumentality, affectivity 
and morality as foci of individual orientations towards a social system.5  Where the 
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction is concerned with the nature of the community 
as a whole, these three orientations should be understood from the perspective of the 
individual member or potential member.  Where the gemeinshaft/gesellschaft helps 
to answer the question “What is this community like?”, this second spectrum helps 
us understand why individuals do or do not feel committed to the group. An 
instrumental orientation focuses on “the rewards and costs that are involved in 
participating in the system.”6  It is the cognitive approach of calculating what the 
individual, as an individual, might gain or lose by joining one particular community 
rather than another.  An affective approach emphasizes emotional connections 
between individuals within the community.  Finally, the moral orientation is an 
evaluative approach concerned with the degree to which the moral norms and 
collective beliefs and/or goals of a given community jibe with those of the 
individual.  Just as with the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft distinction, here too a 
                                                                
4The gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction is one with a long history in the field of 
sociology.  Its origins and first uses are generally attributed to early social theorists Ferdinand 
Toennies, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. 
5This trio was put forward by Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in her seminal work on American 
communes and the bases for members’ commitment to them.  ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, 
COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1972). 
6Id. at 68. 
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combination approach must be used in comparing one community (or, more 
accurately, the orientations of the individual members comprising a community) to 
another.  Yet, also as with the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft distinction, communities 
vary in the degrees to which each of these orientations are present and 
acknowledged.  The decision whether to join one type of community will draw on a 
quite different set of issues and concerns that will affect the decision whether to join 
another type of community.  Thus, where a decision whether to take a job flipping 
burgers or as an investment banker (and thus to join one or the other community of 
employees) would likely draw most heavily on instrumental issues (though perhaps 
with some consideration of affective and moral issues as well), the decision to join 
one religious congregation over another would probably be informed more heavily 
by affective and moral considerations than by instrumental ones. 
In looking at these two sets of distinctions together, there is an intuitive sense that 
the instrumental orientation maps onto the gesellschaft and the affective orientation 
is paired with the gemeinschaft.  In other words, it would seem that, in a community 
in which gesellschaft relations predominate, an individual member’s commitment to 
the group is likely to be based primarily on instrumental considerations; likewise, 
intuitively one suspects that, within a gemeinschaft-dominated community, 
individual commitment is probably rooted in an affective orientation.  While this 
intuitive pairing may in many instances be accurate, two qualifications must be 
made.  First, as discussed briefly above, in looking at these two spectrums, it is vital 
to appreciate that they are not concerned with precisely the same descriptive 
functions.  The gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction aids in describing the 
community as a whole: it indicates the role of a given community and the aggregate 
nature of the interpersonal relations among its members.  Is the community focussed 
like a corporation on the completion of certain tasks?  Or, more like a family, are the 
relations between the individual members the essential element of the community?  
The instrumental/affective/moral spectrum, on the other hand, describes the nature of 
individual members’ commitment to the group.  What issues would a member 
deciding whether to desert the community consider in her decision?  What desires or 
needs would prevent a member from leaving, or make a potential member decide to 
join?7 
Second, though the intuitive mapping of affectivity onto gemeinschaft and 
instrumentality onto gesellschaft may often be accurate, some types of communities 
do defy this matching.  For example, individual commitment to a gemeinschaft-
dominated community of participants in group therapy is likely as much, if not more, 
                                                                
7It is in asking this individually-focussed question regarding the nature of  membership 
commitment to the group that the element of morality comes in.  Though morality does not 
map neatly onto either the gemeinschaft or gesellschaft, it is nonetheless often a significant 
factor in a person’s calculus when deciding whether to join or to quit a community.  In the 
Section I communities, the moral orientation is in predominant part focussed on the religious 
origins and natures of the two communities.  In non-religious communities, as we shall see in 
regards to the Residential Community Associations in Section II, the moral orientation would 
likely focus not necessarily on beliefs, but perhaps rather on collective goals or purposes.  It is 
surely not my intention in this paper to evaluate the respective moralities or moral bases of the 
communities considered herein.  Yet, in order to understand the relation between these 
communities and their respective social control functions, we must in part be concerned with 
members’ conceptions and levels of acceptance of the moral nature of the respective 
communities. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
2001] THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY 277 
instrumentally-oriented than affectivity-oriented.  Though the community of group 
therapy is far more appropriately defined by the family-like gemeinschaftian 
functions, an individual’s decision to participate is likely informed as much by an 
instrumental desire for the individual benefits that therapy might grant as by 
affective orientations.  With this example we see an instance where the informal, 
interpersonal (i.e. gemeinshaft) nature of a community enjoys and relies on an 
individualistic, instrumental basis for commitment.  These two qualifications will 
become important to this paper as we begin to examine the relations between the 
natures of various communities and their respective methods of controlling deviance.  
Where gemeinschaft/gesellschaft will consider from a group perspective the natures 
of the communities, the spectrum of orientations will be concerned with 
understanding individual members’ commitment to the group and the nature of their 
decisions (conscious or otherwise) whether to deviate from the collective norms and 
behaviors of those groups. 
A.  The Oneida Community 
1.  Brief History 
The Oneida Community was one of a number of efforts during the 19th Century 
to escape the increasing industrialization in America.  It was the creation of a single 
man, John Humphrey Noyes.  Born in Vermont in 1811, after a brief stint at a law 
firm and two years at theological seminaries, Noyes set out to create a community in 
which people would be free to reach their spiritual and moral potential.  A variation 
on what was known as Christian Perfectionism, Noyes’ belief was that Christ had 
already returned to the world, “so that redemption or liberation from sin was an 
accomplished fact.”8  Thus, if he could create the right environment, free from the 
stresses and corruptive elements of American society, people could lead lives of 
perfection, free from sin.  Though his evangelistic efforts were great, membership 
grew slowly.  By 1844, he had established a small community of about two dozen 
adult members at Putney, Vermont.  As word of the community, and its less-than-
traditional ways, spread through northern Vermont, it was met with greater and 
greater resentment and contempt.  To escape, in 1847 Noyes and his community fled 
to Oneida, New York.  Once at their new home, Noyes set out to create the type of 
community he believed would be conducive to the existence of an earthly perfection.  
He emphasized two fundamental principles in applying his Perfectionistic 
Christianity to daily life: the possibility of individual perfection and communal 
living.9 
                                                                
8WILLIAM M. KEPHART, EXTRAORDINARY GROUPS 94-95 (1982). 
9The Community at Oneida was to prosper for another thirty years.  As their notoriety 
grew, so too did the pressure from outside forces, much as it did in the Putney years, against 
their “un-American” practices.  Simultaneously, internal conflict grew as well, from two 
primary sources.  First, the Community suffered a burst of deviant behavior and opposition 
sentiment from the second generation of Oneidans, who were born into the Community, rather 
than affirmatively choosing to join. The second source of conflict stemmed from a new 
member, James W. Towner, whose own charismatic leadership rivaled Noyes’ and inspired a 
divisive minority of members to emerge.  [Interestingly, Barbara Fishbein argues that the basis 
of the dissention was that Towner, a lawyer, advocated the replacement of the informal social 
control mechanisms with legal authority. Barbara Fishbein, Justice Without Law? Resolving 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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2.  Perfectionism 
For the Oneidans, individual perfection and communal living were in no way 
exclusive; indeed, it was Noyes’ belief that only through a communal existence, in 
which his brand of Christianity permeated every moment of daily life, could people 
reach perfection.  As Noyes himself said, the community was not intended to “call 
people away from their homes and employments to attend to religion,” but instead to 
turn “their very arrangements for getting a living into the essential conditions of a 
school and church .”10  It would thus be everyday life, rather than specific moments 
in a church or in a classroom, that would nurture the spiritual growth towards 
perfection of the members of the Oneida Community.11  As each person contributed 
to the overall virtue of the environment, the perfection of which, they felt, was a 
prerequisite for individual perfection, members’ fates were thus necessarily 
intertwined.12  Accordingly, in considering the other major aspects of Oneida life, it 
is vital to keep in mind that they were not necessarily the result solely of earthly 
practical considerations, but were also inspired by the community’s spiritual quest 
for perfection.   
3.  Communal Life 
Only through communal living, Noyes believed and taught his followers, could 
the people of Oneida create the type of environment that might enable them to reach 
perfection.  This spirit of communalism would not inform simply the economic 
structure of the community; rather, it would permeate every aspect of life at Oneida. 
From group living arrangements and a community dining hall, to uniform hair styles 
and manners of dress, it was the goal of the Oneida to create the type of gemeinshaft 
relations and intensely affective orientation that might nurture a community-wide 
primary group.13  Even the most gesellschaftian of functions, for example the 
                                                          
Disputes Without Lawyers, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 613, 614. (1983)]  In 1877, Noyes 
resigned as leader of the Oneida, and two years later, in fear of possible legal charges in 
connection with his leadership of the Community, Noyes fled to Canada, never to return.  
Without his guidance and inspiration, the rigid and defining practices of the Community faded 
with time, and on January 1, 1881 the community was dissolved.  It did not, however, cease to 
exist as a business.  With a net worth of $600,000, a joint-stock company was formed in the 
name of Oneida Ltd.  In 1967, Oneida Ltd. went public on the New York Stock Exchange, 
where its stock is still traded.  More on Oneida Ltd. may be found on the internet at 
http://www.oneida.com. 
10G. W. Noyes, Episodes in the Life of John Humphrey Noyes, COMMUNITY QUADRANGLE, 
Dec. 1927, at 6. 
11For a more detailed understanding of the religious underpinnings of the Oneida version 
of Christian Perfectionism, as described by the Community itself, refer to THE ONEIDA 
COMMUNITY, HANDBOOK OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, NO. 2 (1871). 
12This is a variation on what is sometimes called “interconnected welfare,” which Mark D. 
Rosen defines as “the view that an individual’s prospects for self-actualization are inextricably 
connected to how other individuals in her community behave and believe.  Mark D. Rosen, 
The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, 
and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1066 (1998). 
13
“A primary group is a small, face-to-face group characterized by intimate relationships 
and shared feelings, such as the family, the clique, the friendship circle.  A secondary group, 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
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centrally assigned and constantly shifting work duties, were communalized to inspire 
heightened interpersonal, gemeinschaft relations between members.  No function 
within the community was purely functional; each had its own social and 
interpersonal function as well.  Each member of the community was to think of every 
other member with an equal degree of attachment and identification, no single 
member figuring more prominently in one’s mind than another.   
An extreme example of this is to be found in their practice of “complex 
marriage.”  Noyes and the Oneidans believed that “it is not desirable for two 
persons…to become exclusively attached to each other—to worship and idolize each 
other—however popular this experience may be with sentimental people 
generally.”14  Accordingly, under this institution, every member had sexual access to 
every adult member of the opposite sex, with special care given to ensure that no two 
people spent more time together than with any others.  Contrary both to the popular 
belief of the outside world at the time and to the quite different variations instituted 
by the more modern communal societies of the 1960s, however, complex marriage 
was not “free love.”15  Indeed, it was a highly regulated and monitored program, 
intended further to engender solidarity and subvert the possibility of special 
relationships considered dangerous to the spirit of a community-wide primary 
group.16 
This effort to eviscerate the possibility of sub-groups or exclusive relationships 
within the community as a whole extended throughout Oneida life.  Children were 
raised communally, and were reprimanded for showing any special affection for any 
other member, particularly their parents.  Work assignments among the adults were 
changed frequently, to avoid any potential work-related exclusive relationships.  
Analogously, material goods were owned collectively, so that no one could acquire 
special affection for any object.  Even spending too much time alone was frowned 
upon by the Community, as it indicated self-importance rather than the spirit of 
community.  The essence of the Oneida Community was to be found in its communal 
spirit, and in this communal spirit, they believed, was the key to earthly perfection. 
                                                          
on the other hand—such as the large corporation, the business firm, or the government 
bureau—is characterized by an impersonality of association.” KEPHART, supra note 8, at 99. 
14THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, HAND-BOOK OF THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY 14-15 (1867). 
15It is probably more useful to think of complex marriage not along the lines of free love, 
but rather in comparison with the complete celibacy practiced by such of the Oneida’s 
contemporaries as the Shakers.  Thus, complex marriage among the Oneida should be thought 
of much as celibacy was for the Shakers, as the solution to the potential problem of exclusive 
relationships within the community as a whole. 
16Though solidarity was the main underlying purpose behind complex marriage, Noyes 
took great care to cite as the basis for complex marriage passages from the Bible: 
In the kingdom of heaven, the institution of marriage—which assigns the exclusive 
possession of one woman to one man—does not exist (Matt. 22:23-30). 
In the kingdom of heaven, the intimate union, which in the world is limited to pairs, 
extends through the whole body of believers. . . . (John 17:21).  KEPHART, supra note 
8, at 121. 
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4.  Isolation 
That Noyes chose as the home for his community the rural and isolated nature of 
Oneida, New York, was no coincidence.17  After its community relations problems in 
Putney, the Community knew it was in its best interest to avoid any more contact 
than necessary with the outside world.  And, as Kanter explains, “[t]he feeling of ill 
will was mutual.” 18  After all, it was Noyes’ very purpose behind Oneida to create an 
atmosphere free from what he perceived as a sinful and corrupting American society.  
As Kanter continues, “Oneida scorned the outside world as filthy and 
contaminating….Oneida children were horrified by the swearing and depravity of 
village boys.  Children were forbidden to speak to outsiders…. After visitors had 
left, the community gathered for a ritual cleaning ‘bee,’ to efface every trace of an 
‘unclean public’ and of the ‘filthy invaders’.”19  Likewise, a special cleansing ritual 
was required for any member before temporarily leaving the community, and upon 
his or her return.  Centered around the Mansion House, in which the entire 
community lived, the Oneida were an extremely insular community. Its collective 
frame of reference hardly ever extended beyond its own physical, interpersonal and 
psychological boundaries to the outside community, to which the Oneida tellingly 
referred to as “the World.”  Whether intentionally or not, the intense isolation of the 
Oneida Community, by cutting external ties and insulating itself from the contempt 
of the World, further enhanced the solidarity and sense of shared values and goals of 
its members.20 
                                                                
17For a telling description of the area surrounding the Community, and of the effort 
necessary to visit it, see THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 3-5. 
18KANTER, supra note 5, at 18. 
19Id. 
20In discussing the effects of isolation on the solidarity of the Community, I do not intend 
to overlook the difficult issue of whether, in practical reality, members actually perceived 
themselves as free and able to quit the Community.  Particularly for members who had lived at 
Oneida for a considerable time, and perhaps even more particularly for the later members who 
were born at Oneida, the decision to quit the Community surely involved the surmounting of 
serious obstacles.  From the interpersonal (affective) ties that would be broken by departure, to 
the psychological and practical (instrumental) difficulties of immersion into mainstream 
society, to the ideological and religious (moral) ramifications of quitting Noyes’ 
Perfectionism, the impact of quitting the Oneida Community should not be underestimated.  
There is absolutely a thin line (or perhaps more precisely, none at all) between the affirmation 
of collective values through social pressure and isolation and the eradication of the free will of 
individual members.  With increased isolation so too grows a member’s reliance on the 
Community, for interpersonal, economic and social needs.  This is not a theme I will tackle 
squarely in this paper, but to ignore it wholly would be to leave out an essential element.  
Thus, I will touch on the issue, at least tangentially, throughout this paper.  The key, for now, 
is to appreciate the issue from two different perspectives. First, as considered in the text above, 
is that, from a group/strategic perspective, the affective and instrumental reliance on the 
community that intense isolation works to heighten has a significant impact on overall 
membership commitment.  Where ties with the outside world are cut, people are less able (and 
thus less likely) to leave.  On the other hand, though, from an individual perspective, where 
there are such affective and instrumental barriers to departure from the community, there 
ought to be significant concerns about individual members’ rights and freedoms to make their 
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5.  Organizational Structure 
As seems intuitive, the communal nature of the Oneida Community lent itself to 
an egalitarian organizational and decision-making structure.  With the single 
exception of Noyes, whose status among the Community was of a divine nature,21 
day-to-day decisions were made democratically, with more or less equal 
participation from all.  The Handbook of the Oneida Community describes as one of 
the two “measures relied upon for good government...Daily Meetings, which all are 
expected to attend, and in which religious, social and business matters are freely 
discussed….”22  Additionally, particular decisions were frequently distributed to any 
of the several committees formed by interchangeable mixes of members.  In making 
these decisions, the Handbook states, “unanimity is always sought by committees, by 
the Business Board, and by the Community….If there are serious objections to any 
proposed measure, action is delayed until the objections are removed.  The majority 
never go ahead without leaving a grumbling minority behind.”23   
Yet, while these democratic sentiments pervaded both the atmosphere of the 
Oneida Community and its official Handbook, it seems that the major decisions 
faced by the Community were made either by Noyes alone, or with the assistance of 
a small core of “central members,” with the community at large faithfully ratifying 
those decisions.  To the extent that lay-members acknowledged the undemocratic 
nature of these decisions, it seems, they were satisfied by the fact that Noyes, felt by 
all to be divinely inspired and whose ideas were the backbone of the Community’s 
reason for existing, was the one steering the ship.24  Additionally, considering that 
there were at any given time as many as twenty-one committees and forty-eight 
departments, it seems understandable that the Oneidans did not protest this 
centralizing function, in light of what would otherwise likely have been chaos.  With 
this blend of egalitarian participatory democracy where possible, supplemented by 
centralized authority predominantly in the hands of Noyes, ‘[u]p to the very end, the 
Community functioned with scarcely a major quarrel.”25 
6.  Mutual Criticism 
A seemingly natural application of the Oneidans’ religious/moral beliefs in both 
egalitarian communal living and the potential for individual perfection, as well as the 
strong isolation-inspired gemeinschaft relations and affective ties within the 
community, mutual criticism supplied the community with an effective system of 
                                                          
own decisions.  This dichotomy will be considered throughout this paper, especially in Section 
IV. 
21KEPHART, supra note 8, at 111. 
22THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 17. 
23Id. at 18.  Also according to the Handbook, weekly meetings of the Business Board 
referred to above, thought of as a corporate board of directors, could be attended and 
participated in by any member of the community. 
24MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN, ONEIDA 88 (1969).  It should be noted that Noyes’ status 
also provided him with greater sexual access to other members and exempted him from 
receiving mutual criticism (discussed below).   
25KEPHART, supra note 8, at 104. 
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social control.  Though the system evolved somewhat over the course of the 
Community’s existence, the essence of mutual criticism remained the same:  
the character of a given member “became the subject of special scrutiny 
by all the members….On the presentation of his case each member in turn 
was called on to specify, as far and as frankly as possible, every thing 
objectionable in his character and conduct.  In this way the person 
criticized had the advantage of a many-sided mirror in viewing himself, or 
perhaps it may be said was placed in the focus of a spiritual lens 
composed of all the judgments in the [Community].”26 
In this description it is apparent that while mutual criticism may have served a 
social control-function, it was not necessarily viewed in this light by the 
membership.  Rather, it was considered as perhaps the essential nexus between the 
possibility of perfection and a communal existence:  by enlisting the entire 
Community in an individual’s struggle, a sense of interconnectedness and of a shared 
struggle and reason for being were consistently reinforced.27  Thus, even the 
gesellschaft-oriented problem-solving of social control both relied on and reaffirmed 
the affective relations and shared moral authority.28  As testimony to the Oneidans’ 
appreciation of criticism as a self-help mechanism, it should be noted that members 
frequently volunteered to be criticized by the group.  The Community also used the 
process of criticism as a cure for physical ailments.  Calling this version of criticism 
“krinopathy,” or hygienic criticism, the Oneidans boldly claim in their handbook on 
mutual criticism “to have discovered a new curative.” 29 
The social control function of mutual criticism, however, regardless of whether it 
was perceived as such by the typical member, was a powerful force at Oneida.  
While members often volunteered for criticism, it was also frequently imposed on 
particular members when it was felt that their behavior was incongruous with the 
                                                                
26OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST, MUTUAL CRITICISM 16-17 (1876).  For a more 
detailed account of the system of mutual criticism, this text provides instructions on how both 
to receive and give criticism.  It also includes numerous former members’ first-person 
accounts of and reflections on the process. 
27Interestingly, the Community also considered as one of the beneficial functions of 
mutual criticism its preemptive nature in providing a more constructive outlet for the voicing 
of interpersonal conflicts and contentions inevitable in any close community.  As the 
Community states in its publication on the subject, “Criticism is not more free with us, but it is 
distributed more profitably.  We have a systematic plan of distribution, by which the true 
article is insured;  and it is delivered in the right time and place….In the Community we draw 
it off from the mischievous channels of evil-thinking and scandal, and conduct it through plain 
speech to a beneficial result.” Id. at 21. 
28In contrast, as we shall see in later sections, in communities without these tremendously 
strong affective relations and interpersonal needs and pressures, the functional process of 
social control tends to take a much different form.  Where there are no affective and moral 
connections between members, providing for social pressure to conform and individual needs 
to remain within the community, social control must take on a more individualized, 
instrumental and strictly gesellschaft approach. 
29Id. at 71. 
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Community.30  Thus, mutual criticism served two separate but related functions.  On 
the one hand, it allowed the group to reaffirm and communicate to each other, 
through the substance of their criticisms, their perceptions of what it meant to be a 
member of the Oneida Community.  And on the other hand, through the nature of the 
process of criticism, the Community was empowered through this realization and 
reaffirmation of shared values to impose pressure on deviant or potentially deviant 
members to conform to these norms.  It would seem that without this first element of 
collective value affirmation (as might be the case in a less participatory or egalitarian 
criticism process), coupled with the severe isolation of the Community and the 
barriers to exit engendered by it, the social pressure of the second aspect would not 
be nearly as effective.  As it was,  “[m]utual criticism was effective because 
members’ self-esteem depended almost exclusively upon their fellow [members’] 
approval.”31  Accordingly, members undergoing criticism were expected to remain 
silent during the process, objecting only to the most glaring of factual inaccuracies, 
and to receive the criticism with utmost humility and “meekness of spirit”.32  The 
process would frequently conclude with the criticized member’s public confession of 
faults, and a promise to follow the advice of the Community.  The process also 
served a convenient self-selection function:  those whose lack of humility or belief in 
the rightness of the Oneida way (the moral orientation element of commitment) 
prevented them from being able to accept such criticism, when faced with the 
prospect of a life of mutual criticism, simply left the Community.33 
7.  Summary 
The Oneida Community represents about as extreme an example of an intentional 
community as may be found.  For the purposes of this paper, in comparing the 
Oneida Community to the other two communities in Section I, the Amish and Satmar 
communities, five key attributes, all interwoven into the Oneida social fabric, and 
each at least to some degree dependent on the others, should be emphasized.  First, at 
the center of the Oneida value system, and thus at the very heart of their collective 
reason for existing, was a strong and unified moral orientation:  the belief in the 
                                                                
30
“In the great majority of cases criticism is desired and solicited by individuals…but in 
some instances, where it is noticed that persons are suffering from faults or influences that 
might be corrected or removed by criticism, they are advised to submit themselves to it.  In 
extreme cases of disobedience to the Community regulations, or obsession by influences 
adverse to the general harmony, criticism is administered by the Community or its leaders 
without solicitation on the part of the subject.” Id. at 18. 
31CARDEN, supra note 24, at 74. 
32
“If anyone reacted to the criticism with sullen silence or with angry defense, he was 
reproved again.  Stripped of all social support, he found no reassurance until he submitted 
completely to the Community’s judgment.  Submission brought Community approval and 
personal catharsis.” Id. at 76.  This humility and obedience to authority will be compared 
below to the similar concept of Gelassenheit, one of the major tenets of the Amish belief 
system. 
33On average, between three to five adult members left the community, or “seceded” each 
year.  Though because this number does not include children, who were generally taken by 
seceding parents, the actual number was probably somewhat higher.  CARDEN, supra note 24, 
at 77. 
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potential of every person, if placed in the proper environment, to achieve a perfect 
(sin-free) existence.  Thus, as will be seen strongly in the other communities in 
Section I, religion is not only at the heart of the Oneida ideology and belief system, 
but is also impossible to separate from the daily activities of its members.  Second, in 
providing such a perfection-inspiring environment, the Oneida Community was 
communal in nature, with a dominant focus on the collective, rather than on the 
individual.  Third, the strongly gemeinschaft-oriented organizational and decision-
making structure was, to a large degree, egalitarian, often requiring intense 
participation from, and instilling a sense of involvement in every member.  Fourth, 
the exception to this egalitarianism may be seen in the divine status and major-
decision-authority granted by the Community to its founder and charismatic leader, 
John Humphrey Noyes.  Fifth, the Community was intensely isolated, both 
physically and psychologically, from American society, effectively eviscerating 
individual members’ interpersonal, social, political, or moral connections to the 
“World.” 
All of these five factors together contributed both to a very defined set of 
communally held beliefs, values, goals, and norms, and to a climate of intense social 
relations and individual reliance on social connectedness between, and acceptance 
from, community members.  As a result, the Oneida could utilize these affective and 
gemeinschaft orientations towards functional (gesellschaft) ends—the deep feelings 
between members, and the social pressure inspired by these feelings could be 
harnessed by and institutionalized in the process of mutual criticism to control 
deviance and maintain the boundaries of the Oneida community circle. Thus, just as 
we will see in the following two examples, a symbiotic relationship existed between 
core community values, the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft nature of the community, the 
individual desires and needs of members, and the exercise of social control.  As the 
re-affirming and deviance-controlling nature of mutual criticism guarded against the 
gradual erosion of the Oneida’s shared beliefs, the system of mutual criticism itself 
could never have succeeded without reliance on those very same values.  Likewise, 
just as the isolation- and communalism-inspired affective relations between members 
made possible a group-oriented process of social control, this social control process 
at the same time worked to heighten members’ reliance on and need for social 
acceptance.   It is in these symbiotic relationships that the circle of the Oneida 
Community is drawn, the effect being simultaneously the coalescing of the 
community within and the erecting and reinforcing of a barrier without. 
B.  The Old Order Amish 
1.  Brief History 
The Amish are one of the several direct descendants of the Swiss Anabaptists, 
who, along with the followers of Martin Luther, John Calvin and Ulrich Zwingli, 
broke from the Roman Catholic Church in the early 16th Century.  Considered more 
radical than the other reformers of their day, the Anabaptists centered their beliefs 
around strong commitment to community, strict adherence to the teachings of Jesus, 
and the concept of adult baptism.34  They believed that, according to the bible, since 
                                                                
34
“The term Anabaptist originated as a nickname meaning ‘rebaptizer’.” JOHN A. 
HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 27 (3d ed., The John Hopkins University Press 1980). 
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sin only comes with the knowledge of good and evil, then babies, who are without 
such knowledge, have no need for the purification of baptism.  Thus, the Anabaptists 
felt that baptism was more appropriate once a person has matured and become 
accountable for his or her own actions.   
Divisions soon emerged, however, and around 1536, the Mennonites, under the 
leadership of Menno Simons, broke from the rest of the Anabaptists.  Nearing the 
end of the 17th century, after two-hundred years of agrarian living in the European 
valleys of the Jura and Vosges Mountains, a further rift divided the Mennonite 
majority from a group that would, behind the divisive presence of Jacob Amman, 
become the Amish.  The Amish believed that the Mennonites had unacceptably 
relaxed many of their practices.  The new group advocated semi-annual Communion 
(rather than annual), a traditional physical appearance, and restoration of the 
Meidung—punishment of religious wrongdoers through excommunication and strict 
social avoidance.35 
As part of the great waves of Germanic immigration of the 18th and 19th 
Centuries, in 1737 the first Amish ship, the Charming Nancy, arrived on the shores 
of the new world.  This would be only the first of many loads of Amish people 
seeking religious tolerance in America during the mid-18th century, and again during 
the mid-19th century.  These early immigrants settled first in Pennsylvania, but, in 
time, expanded westward to Ohio, Indiana, Iowa and elsewhere  Though enjoying 
the freedoms of the New World, factions among the Amish continued to divide the 
population.  On three occasions between 1877 and 1966, small groups of Amish, 
finding the strictness of Amish life oppressive, sprung out of the traditional Amish 
community.  The first, the Meetinghouse Amish, eventually folded into the 
Mennonite church, while the other two groups, the Peachey (or Beachy) Amish and 
the New Order Amish continue today.  Thus it is that the traditional Amish, from 
which these three groups sprung, have come to be called Old Order (or House) 
Amish.36  As of the mid-1980s, there were 175 major Old Order Amish settlements 
in North America, home to just over 100,000 Old Order Amish.37  Today’s Old 
Order Amish,38 unlike the Oneida Community discussed above, are the possessors of 
a long and storied tradition, a fact which, as will be seen below, has significant 
effects on the nature and functioning of the community.39 
                                                                
35Details of the Amish use of the Meidung will be explored in detail further on in this 
section. 
36It will be the Old Order Amish, the most traditional of the Amish groups, that will be the 
focus of this section.  While there are even variations (mainly in custom) among the many Old 
Order Amish communities in America, they are similar enough that they may, for the purposes 
of this paper, be considered as a single group.  More on the organizational factors that allow 
such variations within the Old Order Amish will come later in this section.   
37DAVID LUTHY, AMISH SETTLEMENTS ACROSS AMERICA 1-6 (1985); BEN J. RABER, THE 
NEW AMERICAN ALMANAC (1986). 
38For the sake of convenience, unless specified, I will refer to the Old Order Amish simply 
as “Amish.” 
39For a very helpful timetable of significant events in the history of the Amish, dating back 
to A.D. 70.  See BERND G. LANGIN, PLAIN AND AMISH 384-89 (1994). 
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2.  Amish Christianity and Gelassenheit 
The Amish version of Christianity, much like the Oneida’s, is one that permeates 
every aspect of daily life.40  To the Amish, Christianity is better learned and practiced 
through everyday activity and work than it is through textual study.  At the heart of 
this Amish Christian lifestyle is the notion of Gelassenheit, which, roughly translated 
as “submission,” incorporates into the Amish belief system the qualities of 
“obedience, humility, submission, thrift and simplicity.”41  Where modern 
Christianity is focussed around a church, the Amish have no such place of worship, 
instead rotating from home to home for bi-weekly community prayer services.42 
Where modern Christian children attend Sunday School, and where modern 
Christian leaders are ordained and evaluated on the basis of their knowledge and 
scholarship, the Amish frown upon too much knowledge of the scriptures.  Likewise, 
even the preachers of the community, elected by the community not necessarily on 
the basis of their religious scholarship,43 during their sermons tend not to analyze, 
rationalize or otherwise interpret the words of the bible.  The Amish believe that the 
established Christian church has lost its way, and that in isolating themselves from 
that mainstream Christianity, it is “[t]he aim of the Amish [ ] to incarnate the 
teachings of Jesus into a voluntary social order.”44  As will be seen in the features 
considered below, Amish Christianity lies at the very center of what defines the 
Amish community. 
3.  Communalism 
The Amish do not live communally.  Quite to the contrary, it is the family 
structure (in the traditional sense of parents and children) that both socially and 
economically binds the Amish together.  Traditionally an agrarian people, it is the 
ambition of the typical Amish family to own and work its own small farm, husband 
and wife saving money from marriage someday to help their children make down 
payments on their own farms.45  Yet while the primary group for the Amish is the 
                                                                
40It is thus vital to realize in considering the nature of the Amish community, that it is 
essentially impossible to isolate religion from the rest of Amish life. 
41DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 25 (1989). 
42It is from this tradition that the name “House Amish” likely arose. 
43
“Attending a seminary would be a sure sign of worldliness and reason for 
excommunication, for it would indicate a loss of humility and the development of an ego.” 
HOSTETLER, supra note 34, at 108. 
44Id. at 77.  As a basis for this desire for isolation, the Amish generally point to three 
biblical passages: Rom. 12:2 (“Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the 
renewing of your mind that ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of 
God.”); II Cor. 6:14 (“Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers; for what 
fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?  What communion hath light with 
darkness?”); and 1 Peter 2:9 (“But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy 
nation, a peculiar people.”). 
45Id. at 132.  In recent times, due both to modern farming innovations and to serious land 
squeezes, some Amish families are having to leave the farming lifestyle.  Where possible, they 
try to find work in farming-related industries like carpentry.  For a discussion of this recent 
phenomenon, in reference to a particular Indiana Amish community, see Thomas J. Meyers, 
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immediate family, a variety of factors contributes to what is, if not a community-
wide primary group, at the least a community-wide sense of shared beliefs and 
interdependence to a degree rarely seen in modern American society. 
Amish communalism, then, is not so much literal communalism, in the sense of 
group ownership and group living, but rather a spiritual communalism based in the 
spirit of Gelassenheit.  There is an understanding among the Amish that the fate of 
the community as a whole supercedes individuality or individual ownership.  Thus, 
while individual families own their own homes and farms, reaping profits to be kept 
by those individual family units, the level of sharing and interdependence between 
families, as Elmer and Dorothy Swhwieder argue, is such that the Amish may be 
called a “semicommunal society.”46  Wherever possible, the Amish form collectives: 
from fire insurance47 to medical insurance to bank loans, the community organizes to 
divide responsibility among the many families.  In a particularly widely reported 
series of events, the Amish refused, on the basis of their faith, to pay or receive 
social security.48  Arguing that their receipt of social security would create a 
dependence on the United States government, an abhorrent result in their eyes, they 
sought, and ultimately received, an exemption from the law mandating payments 
from self-employed persons.49  This “mutual assistance” also appears informally.  
For example, when an Amish farmer desires to build a new building, the community 
will come together for a day, for what they term a “frolic”, to construct the building.  
Thus, as was the case among the Oneida, though here perhaps to a somewhat lesser 
degree, the Amish inject into many of their daily gesellschaft functions (insurance 
building construction, etc.) the spirit of gemeinschaft.   The Amish desire for 
community independence from external aid, coupled with the difficulties of the 
agricultural life (particularly in light of their self-imposed technological restrictions, 
discussed below), make this mutual assistance a necessity.  Yet, as practically and 
functionally necessary as it may be, mutual aid also serves to reinforce a sense of 
interdependence and communalism—a sense of gemeinschaft community—among 
the Amish. 
4.  Isolation and The Ordnung 
As discussed above, the Amish seek to separate themselves from mainstream 
American society.  Once, perhaps, the Amish were as physically isolated as were the 
                                                          
Lunch Pails and Factories, in THE AMISH STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY 165-181 (Donald B. 
Kraybill & Marc A. Olshan eds., 1994). 
46DOROTHY SCHWEIDER & ELMER SCHWEIDER, A PECULIAR PEOPLE: IOWA’S OLD ORDER 
AMISH 39 (1975). 
47One representative example of an Iowa Amish community’s internal fire insurance 
system is described in A Peculiar People.  It explains that where a member “loses a farm 
building due to fire or windstorm, the farmer suffering the misfortune will pay one-fourth the 
cost himself and the remaining three-fourths is divided among” the rest of the community, 
each family paying according to its needs, as determined by church leaders.  Id. at 40-41. 
48See, e.g., Clarence W. Hall, The Revolt of the Plain People, READER’S DIGEST, Nov. 
1962. 
49Before Congressional committees, they cited the Bible as the basis of their refusal:  “if 
any provide not . . . for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an 
infidel.”  1 Tim. 5:8. 
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Oneida Community.  But with their own increased numbers, and the shrinking of 
farmland across America generally, it is one of the Amish’s great struggles with 
modernity to maintain this sense of separateness from the growing levels of intrusion 
from the outside world.50  Thus, in recent times, where it is not uncommon for Amish 
families to have non-Amish neighbors living right next door, Amish separateness 
must be reinforced in other ways.  For this, the Amish have the Ordnung.  In part 
deriving from centuries-old tradition, and in part the result of semi-annual meetings 
of local church leaders, the Ordnung are the rules by which Amish life is defined and 
by which Amish identity is formed and reinforced.  In so doing, it serves as the basis 
for Amish separateness and isolation. 
As mentioned briefly above, the Amish are practitioners of adult baptism.  Prior 
to baptism (which usually takes place between sixteen and twenty-one years of age), 
a young Amish person is not technically responsible for following the Ordnung.  It is 
not until baptism, the moment at which the member voluntarily decides51 to become 
a full adult member of the church, that he or she must, in the eyes of the church and 
the community, rigorously follow the rules of the church district.  This fact has 
                                                                
50For more on the effects of modernity on the Amish lifestyle and economic pursuits, 
much is provided in DONALD B. KRAYBILL & STEVEN M. NOLT, AMISH ENTERPRISE (1995); 
and in KRAYBILL & OLSHAN, supra note 45. 
51I would like again to consider, much as I did in discussing the Oneida above, the reality 
of a young Amish person’s ability to choose not to take baptism—to decide not to become a 
full member of the church.  Prior to baptism, because the young Amish are not literally 
required by the church to follow the rules of the Ordnung, the responsibility of keeping the 
youths in line falls on parents.  From early childhood, Amish children are made aware of their 
distinctiveness, and are raised so carefully within an insular Amish world that they generally 
do not feel comfortable outside of it.  They wear distinctive Amish clothing, learn to speak 
German, and attend Amish schools.  In other words, through the maintenance of a strict Amish 
upbringing, the Amish community creates for its youths an affective and instrumental 
dependence and a moral provincialism that in many instances constructs a virtually 
insurmountable obstacle to an individual member’s efforts to exit the community.  Thus, even 
though pre-baptism Amish youths are given somewhat more latitude than full adult members 
(for exactly the purpose of informing their upcoming baptism decision through experiencing a 
taste of the outside world), only a small percentage of Amish youths choose not to be baptized 
into the adult membership.  Interestingly, it seems that the more liberal Amish communities 
(the New Order Amish, the Beachy Amish and the like), whose youths tend to gain somewhat 
more experience with the outside world, have on average a much lower retention rate.  In one 
Ohio county, for example, the most traditional Amish communities retain around 90 percent of 
their youths, where the least traditional Amish groups baptize less than 60 percent.  See 
KRAYBILL & OLSHAN, supra note 45, at 73.   
Whether these retention rates evidence the greater appeal of increasingly strict Amish life, 
or the effects of a dangerously isolated and regimented childhood has long been discussed.  
Much of the debate since the Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 
(exempting Amish children from mandatory schooling until the age of sixteen) involved the 
issue of Amish children’s rights to make their own life choices.  Many argued that, because of 
the insulated nature of an Amish upbringing (made increasingly insular by the Court’s 
decision in Yoder), Amish children are effectively precluded from making their own voluntary 
decisions whether to remain within the Amish community or to leave it.  This issue will be 
reconsidered in Section IV. 
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significant implications in regard to excommunication and shunning, discussed 
below, in connection with transgressions of the Ordnung.52 
Because much of the Ordnung is not based on tradition, but rather on the semi-
yearly decisions of each community’s leaders, there is invariably some variation in 
custom from one Amish community to another.  However, as one scholar familiar 
with the Amish explains, it is not so much the particular customs that are of utmost 
significance, but rather the effect of these customs in separating the Amish from the 
rest of the world. 
To be separate from the world is to be different from the world.  Being 
different is more important, within limits, than specific ways of being 
different....The strong commitment to the principle of separation from the 
world also helps to explain why the Amish are not disturbed by slightly 
different rules in other Amish communities.53 
For the most part, however, the Ordnung remains fairly constant from one 
community to another.  Long hair, dark, formal clothes, shaven mustaches with long 
beards for married men, no automobiles, no central heating or electricity, the use of 
horses, limited formal education and the use of German dialect tend to be the most 
universal and outwardly observable tenets of the Ordnung.  It is precisely because of 
the outward perceptibility of these features that they are practiced by the Amish: to 
look different is to be different.  Also, with proscriptions on automobiles, televisions 
and the like, the Amish not only look to separate others from them, but also to isolate 
themselves from others.  Thus, the Ordnung serves three related functions:  first, to 
forge identity by visibly distinguishing the Amish from their mainstream neighbors; 
second, to form and reinforce a common lifestyle by which to unify the members of 
a given Amish community; and third, whether intentional or not, to create the types 
of strong affective, instrumental, and moral isolation to serve as a barrier to 
membership secession. 
5.  Organizational Structure 
Amish communities may be found in twenty-three different states or provinces 
across North America.54  Yet, with the exception of relatively recent and issue-
specific organizations and committees, they have few organizational structures 
extending beyond the individual church district level.  A typical church district, the 
basic social unit beyond the individual family, is generally comprised of about 
twenty extended family units (around 165 people), living in close distance to each 
other.55  Because of high rates of intermarriage, many members of a single district 
will have the same last name, often with four or five names accounting for nearly 
                                                                
52For an account of the standard Amish baptismal service, see HOSTETLER, supra note 32, 
at 81-83. 
53Id. at 85. 
54For a listing of each settlement, including the date founded and the number of 
congregations per settlement, see David Luthy, Amish Migration Patterns: 1972-1992, in THE 
AMISH STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY (Donald B. Kraybill & Marc A. Olsham eds., 1994). 
55KRAYBILL, supra note 41, at 76. 
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three-fourths of the district population.56  The church district is the central unit 
around which Amish social, religious and economic life revolves. 
As the central community unit, each church district has its own leadership, 
consisting of three positions: a bishop (though sometimes a bishop will preside over 
two districts), two or three preachers, and a deacon.  Each position has its own roles 
and responsibilities, usually extending from the religious nature to the social to the 
political.  At the head of this structure presides the bishop, the spiritual head of the 
community.  It is his job to interpret local regulations and to make decisions 
regarding deviant behavior.  Beneath the bishop, the preachers, sometimes called 
ministers, are responsible for giving the sermons during the bi-weekly worship 
services.  Finally, it is the deacon’s job to lead prayers during worship services and 
to assist the needy of the community. Though these are the general duties of the three 
positions, they often overlap with each other and also expand into other areas of life.  
As one scholar explained, quite generally, “The bishop, minister, and deacon form an 
informal ‘executive committee’ that guides and coordinates the activities of the local 
district.”57 
Though an organizational body consisting of only four or five members may 
seem like a rather centralized model, several contributing factors reveal that the 
Amish posses within this structure a strong sense of egalitarian democratic 
participation.  First, in a manner reminiscent of the Oneidan decision-making 
process, though the leaders of the community often give advice and make 
recommendations on major community decisions, technically, the decisions are not 
made without a vote of all adult members of the church district.  With this in mind, 
Hostetler has labeled the Amish organizational/decision-making system a 
“patriarchal democracy.”58 
The second insight into the Amish organizational structure comes with an 
understanding of the process of selecting these leaders.  With the exception of the 
bishop, who must first serve in one of the lesser positions before rising to bishop, the 
district leaders are selected on the combined basis of democratic choice and divine 
intervention.  When a position opens up (which is rare, since leadership positions are 
for life), each adult district member casts a nomination, whispering to the bishop 
through a nearly closed door the name of a fellow-member who would be fit for the 
task. When all the nominees have been selected, a stack of bibles is piled before 
them, one bible for each nominee.  Each nominee in turn chooses one bible from the 
collection, in one of which has secretly been placed a piece of paper containing a 
biblical passage.  The one who chooses the bible with the extra piece of paper has 
been “struck,” and has thus been chosen in accordance with God’s will to help lead 
the community.  In this manner, much as John Humphrey Noyes’s divine status lent 
a spiritual weight to his words and decisions, by allowing God’s will to make the 
final selection for district leaders, the Amish may also rely on those leaders’ 
decisions  as being, to a degree, the will of God.  It is with this combination of 
egalitarian democracy and religious faith, based on the spirit of Gelassenheit, that 
                                                                
56Id. at 77. 
57Id. at 80. 
58HOSTETLER, supra note 34, at 111. 
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decisions are made and shared values and social norms are determined, reified, and 
enforced. 
6.  The Meidung 
As mentioned above, at the heart of the Amish split from the Mennonites around 
1700 was the controversy over the Meidung.  To this day, where Mennonite 
communities do not strictly enforce the Meidung (“the shunning or avoiding of 
excommunicated members”),59 for the Amish, it is perhaps the central element of 
social control.60  With scriptural bases in 1 Cor. 5:9-11, Rom. 16:17, 2 Thess. 
3:14,15, and Titus 3:10,11, the Meidung serves numerous purposes, from punishing 
the transgressor, to attempting to coax the transgressor towards mending his ways, to 
protecting the rest of the community from impure elements.  One insight into the 
reasoning behind the Meidung, as explained by Amish leaders themselves, states as 
follows: 
If anyone whether it be through a wicked life or perverse doctrine 
is...expelled from the church he must also according to the doctrine of 
Christ and his apostles, be shunned and avoided by all the members of the 
church.... In short that we are to have nothing to do with him; so that we 
may not become defiled by intercourse with him and partakers of his sins, 
but that he may be made ashamed, be affected in his mind, convinced in 
his conscience and thereby induced to amend his ways.61 
Though fear of the Meidung looms over all facets of Amish life, its actual 
application Meidung is considered a last resort.  Where a transgressor of the 
Ordnung has been identified, generally, the first step is an informal one: gossip 
within the community and the like.  Where this shows no effect, the church leaders 
will tend to intervene, either in the form of a visit to the transgressor by the bishop or 
preacher, or else a request for the transgressor to appear before the congregation to 
confess his or her errant behavior and ask forgiveness.  Where necessary, however, if 
no apology or improvement in behavior is made, the final step is the imposition of 
the Meidung.  Because of the seriousness of this last resort, though the bishop is the 
one formally responsible for imposing the Meidung, it generally will not be imposed 
without the near consensus of the entire church district.  Once the punishment has 
been imposed, however, it is total.  The shunned member may not eat at the same 
table as his family, and must sleep in a separate bed or room.  If he or she is married, 
marital relations will be terminated.  Generally, church members are persuaded to 
have as little contact as possible with the shunned member.  The Meidung will 
extend not only to the members of the church district (who, if they ignore the 
Meidung, will themselves receive the same punishment), but also to all other Amish 
communities.  The Meidung, then, is not only aimed at the transgressor (either as 
punishment or as an incentive to reform), but may also be considered a command to 
the community in general, serving the multiple purposes of (1) setting an example of 
                                                                
59KEPHART, supra note 8, at 49. 
60Recall that because Amish people who have yet to be baptized are not required by the 
church to follow the rules of the Ordnung, they are likewise not subject to the imposition of 
the Meidung. 
61KRAYBILL, supra note 41, at 116 (citing The Dordrecht Confession of Faith). 
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what happens to transgressors, (2) protecting the community from unwanted 
influences, and (3) reinforcing the acceptable boundaries of behavior. 
From the perspective of the shunned member, however, the imposition of the 
Meidung is a harsh reality.  Because of the Amish community’s high degree of 
isolation from mainstream society, a shunned member is not only suddenly without 
the constant contact and affection of his friends and family, but is also left in a very 
unfamiliar world.   It is a limbo state between, on one side, his or her family and 
community, who are forbidden from interacting with him or her, and on the other 
side the outside world, with which the shunned member has likely had extremely 
little contact.  Furthermore, a newly shunned member realizes that a move towards 
mainstream society will only alienate him or her further from the Amish community.  
It is this sense of limbo that makes the Meidung, and perhaps even more 
significantly, the very threat of the Meidung, so effective. 
Though the Meidung is imposed for life, it may be revoked upon the public 
admission and apology of the shunned member.  And, as one writer explains, the pull 
of desire for renewed acceptance by the community tends to be quite effective in 
eliciting such an apology:  “Following the pronouncement of shunning, the religious 
leaders continue their efforts to persuade the sinful member to repent and again enter 
into full fellowship with the group.  Faced with loss of contact with friends and 
family as well as the immense family suffering, the errant member will usually 
quickly repent.”62  Yet, Amish leaders are aware that the Meidung is not imposed 
solely with the individual transgressor in mind—it has also been imposed for the 
protection of the whole community from the contaminating effects of “un-Amish 
behavior.”  Premature re-acceptance of the shunned member may jeopardize the 
whole community if his or her behavior has not truly been modified.  Church leaders 
must therefore walk a fine line between, among other considerations, their desire to 
help the shunned member mend his or her ways, and their responsibility to protect 
the community from further corruption.63 
7.  Summary 
Having survived and prospered in America for more than 250 years, the Old 
Order Amish are a shining example of resilience.  Though their culture has surely 
evolved since the 18th Century, the ability of the Amish over the years to maintain a 
powerful sense of community and an equally strong sense of separateness from the 
rest of society, is remarkable.  In comparing the Amish to the other two communities 
in this Section, six features stand out as particularly significant.  First, unlike the 
Oneida, the Amish have a long and well-documented history.  In their ability to point 
to generations of blood descendants in whose path they follow, and the hardships 
that those generations faced, the Amish gain a potent tool in encouraging a sense of 
tradition and a shared desire to perpetuate it.  Second, the spirit of Gelassenheit, at 
the core of Amish beliefs, feeds not only obedience to current community norms but 
also the humility and submission beneficial to maintaining order and social control 
                                                                
62SCHWEIDER & SCHWEIDER, supra note 46, at 67. 
63For a description of the procedure for readmitting shunned members back into the 
community following their public admission and apology, see Joseph Unzicker, Restoring A 
Fallen Member,  in AMISH ROOTS: A TREASURY OF HISTORY, WISDOM, AND LORE 92-93 (John 
A. Hostetler ed., 1989). 
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over time.  Third, the Amish variation on communalism, the formal and informal 
mutual assistance of “semi-communalism,” serves the dual role of perpetuating the 
economic health of the community and of forging a sense of collective responsibility, 
interdependence and shared fate.  Fourth, though not as physically isolated as the 
Oneida, the strict rules of the Ordnung and the visibly distinctive lifestyle mandated 
by it, nonetheless successfully isolate the Amish from their mainstream neighbors.  
Fifth, the organizational and decision-making structure of the Amish church districts 
creates a strong sense of participation.  A small, essentially self-sufficient and 
autonomous social unit, with leaders determined by both popularly and divinely 
selected forces, the church district creates an atmosphere of “patriarchal democracy” 
that instills in its lay members a strong sense of involvement in the community. 
Just as was seen with the Oneida, the combination of the above characteristics 
makes social pressure a particularly potent force.  Yet, perhaps because of the 
relatively greater emphasis among the Amish on family as the primary group, or 
because of the humility and submission of Gelassenheit, or the weaker emphasis 
placed on individual perfection, mutual criticism is not to be found among the 
Amish.  It is instead the fear of the Meidung—of being excluded from the 
particularities and closeness of the community and cast out into an unfamiliar 
world—that works to control deviant behavior.  Thus, just as mutual criticism 
worked symbiotically with the characteristics of Oneida life, so too does the 
Meidung rely on, and at the same time perpetuate, the shared norms and beliefs of 
the Amish.  Without the intense isolation, the strong sense of tradition, the 
submission of Gelassenheit, and the rest of the characteristics that together comprise 
Amish-ness, the Meidung would be nothing more than the common occurrence to 
which mainstream Americans benignly refer as “leaving the nest.”  The Meidung 
fortifies the circumference around the Amish circle of community. 
C.  Conclusions 
From an examination of these two examples of community, we can make several 
observations and glean a number of important lessons.  We see that strong 
orientations towards affectivity and moral cohesion, coupled with predominantly 
gemeinschaftian functions, creates a climate of heightened social pressure.  Among 
both the Amish and the Oneida, members held cohesive and clear understandings of 
what was “right” or “wrong” behavior.  In the form both of clear religious and moral 
bases of belief and of structured and systematic programs of communalism, civic 
participation, and physical and symbolic isolation from the outside world, the Amish 
and Oneida constantly reinforced group norms of belief and behavior.  Further, 
community members were able to impose these collective norms on potential 
deviants, because of the intense affectivity felt between members.  Humility and a 
group-first mentality were emphasized in both these communities, intensifying the 
power of criticism from the community, and to a degree deflating any potential for 
discussion of individual substantive or procedural rights.  It might thus be said that 
the strong interconnectedness among members, and the cohesiveness of beliefs and 
norms enabled these communities to infuse into their gesellschaft functions (in 
particular that of social control) the benefits of gemeinschaft relations. 
Adding to the internal authority of this informal social control, the intense 
isolation of these communities likely made ties between members and general 
acceptance from the community seem, to the individual member, all the more a 
necessity for survival.  Interpersonal ties to the outside world were few; educational 
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instruction on the skills needed to survive in the outside world were scarce; and the 
moral and religious teachings of the community painted a picture of the outside 
world as a dangerous and troubled place.  In envisioning the circles of community 
proposed at the beginning of this paper, where there were few (or perhaps none) 
other circles overlapping these communities, the transition from one circle to anther 
(as the result of significant deviation from group norms) is a seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle.   Accordingly, not only was the potency of social pressure a 
product of deep internal ties, but it was also a result of the fact that barriers to exit 
(both affective, instrumental and moral) were rigorous, and thus the risks of 
deviance—complete alienation and isolation from one’s community—were 
incredibly severe.64  In the most simple terms, we see, again, that there is a symbiotic 
relationship at work within each of the Section I communities, between the core 
values, goals and general natures of those communities and their respective social 
control functions.  
III.  SECTION II.   
A.  Residential Community Associations 
More than 205,000 Residential Community Associations (RCAs) throughout the 
United States are home to over 42 million Americans, representing 15% of all 
housing nationwide.65  Thus, unlike with the other communities considered above, it 
would be ridiculous to discuss all RCAs as a single community.  In this section, I 
will look at the “RCA movement” in generalized terms, drawing on secondary 
sources which have in the same manner examined the most common features of the 
many RCAs.  Though the picture of RCAs will not emerge as clearly as the other, 
more specific (and smaller) communities considered above, it is my hope that this 
section will provide at least some understanding of why people have chosen to create 
and live in RCAs, the nature of “community” within RCAs, the organizational 
structures of those associations, and the manner in which deviant behavior is 
controlled.  In other words, it is my goal to consider the RCA movement from the 
same perspective and with the same format as I have previously considered the other 
communities above.  This will, I hope, provide an interesting basis by which to 
compare extremely different types of communities, and the relationships within each 
of those communities between shared beliefs, values and behavioral norms and the 
mechanisms by which they are controlled, reinforced and perpetuated by the 
community. 
                                                                
64We will return for further discussion of the significance of individual member’s barriers 
to exit in Section IV. 
65This figure was provided by the Community Associations Institute, a national nonprofit 
organization created to provide guidance and educational and training services to RCA 
memberships and management.  To find out more, see http://www.caionline.org (last visited 
April 2001).  
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
2001] THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY 295 
1.  Definition and Brief History 
Though RCAs66 take numerous forms, in most basic terms they may all as a 
group be defined as mandatory membership organizations, entered into by covenant 
in conjunction with deed of ownership, which require dues assessments from its 
members in return for providing a wide array of services and shared facilities.  They 
may vary in size from fewer than ten residents to as many as 68,000, with 
organizational structures of correspondingly varying sizes.  They may be 
“territorial,” with numerous individual buildings on a common site, some owned 
individually by members, some owned by the association; or they may be contained 
within a single hi-rise building, with each member owning individually the interior 
space of a given apartment unit, and sharing in the ownership of the common areas.67 
A third, though far less common type of legal structure is the cooperative, in which 
individual members do not own units outright, but rather all own shares in the entire 
building, and as a result of share-ownership gain rights to particular units.  
Regardless of legal format, when an individual purchases a unit within an RCA, he 
or she becomes contractually bound by that Association’s conditions, covenants, and 
restrictions (“CC&R’s”), which much like a city’s local ordinances (or in a sense like 
the Amish Ordnung), govern life within the Community.68 
It is likely that the broad conception at the heart of the RCA—a blend of 
individual home ownership and shared use of common spaces—dates back to the 
                                                                
66Other commonly used names for RCAs include:  residential associations, homeowners’ 
associations, property owners’ associations, planned communities, condominium associations, 
common interest associations, cooperatives, or councils of co-owners. 
67For the purposes of this paper, there is no great need to get into the details of the various 
possible legal forms of RCAs.  Most basically, RCAs blend individual unit ownership with 
shared ownership of or responsibility for common areas and shared facilities.  Thus, when a 
person purchases a unit, be it a stand-alone house within a “territorial” association or a 
condominium apartment unit, he or she will also, as a mandatory effect of purchase, by 
covenant enter into the Association.  In so doing, that individual will gain the benefit of 
common facilities and services,—generally, either (1) as with condominiums, through 
contractual common interest ownership (of the property directly, where unincorporated, or 
indirectly, as a shareholder, where incorporated), or  else (2) where the Association itself owns 
the common areas, through contractual membership assessment fees.  For a more detailed 
account of the various legal structures of RCAs, see, WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW (1998). 
68This comparison between RCAs and cities is perhaps the most controversial and widely 
debated issue in the field.  Its ramifications, from Due Process issues to Equal Protection 
issues, to §1983 liability issues, are huge.  Though in this section I will discuss some of the 
public functions served by RCAs, I will not directly address the public-private distinction. For 
one source providing a nice survey of the debate, see Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, 
Private Communities or Public Governments: ‘The State Will Make the Call’, 30 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 509 (1996).  For a second, much shorter article, covering the major theories of public-
private distinction, and the consequences of finding RCAs private, see Katherine Rosenberry, 
Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Should They Be Treated Like ‘Mini-
Governments?,’ in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:  PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
ed., 1989). 
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earliest of civilizations.69  But according to at least one expert in the RCA field, the 
modern conception got its start in 1808, with the creation by covenant upon the 
conveyance of land, a mandate specifically designating property in Leicester Square, 
in London, England to remain as a garden to be freely enjoyed by adjoining tenants.  
With the Court’s decision in Tulk v. Moxhay 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) to 
enforce the covenanted restriction (on grounds that the purchaser was aware of the 
restriction), the notion of equitable servitudes was born, and with it the concept of 
insuring future property-sharing through the use of such restricting covenants.  
In time, the notion of restrictive covenants made its way across the Atlantic, 
finding open arms at the turn of the 20th Century in the form of upper-class 
communities seeking legal teeth for their exclusionary desires.70  With the New Deal, 
the birth of the Federal Housing Commission, and the post-war baby boom, 
subdivisions with restrictive covenants in their deeds began to proliferate, and at the 
same time the popularity of the condominium grew enormously.71  Yet, even by 
1960, fewer than one thousand Associations existed nationwide, and most were still 
single-family unit Associations “in relatively exclusive neighborhoods.”72  With 
increases in property costs during the 1960s, though, developers began to have 
difficulty finding buyers for their large lot single-family homes.  At the same time, 
local governments, facing budget crunches, were seeking ways of reducing their own 
responsibility in providing services to their citizens.  In reaction to these concurrent 
trends, developers began to subdivide the large lots, building smaller, less expensive 
houses with relaxed use restrictions (known as Planned Use Developments, or 
PUDs), and providing formerly-government-provided services through the inception 
of RCAs.73  At the same time, also on the basis of their inexpensiveness and 
convenience, condominium sales were skyrocketing as well.  By the end of the 
1970s, there were 186,000 condominium starts each year, accounting for 14% of all 
annual housing starts.74  In all, about half of all new homes currently built in the 
United States are in RCAs.75 
Through the 1980s, RCAs grew both in number and in variety.  No longer were 
they solely enclaves for the rich or resort communities for the elderly.  They now 
spanned in scope from a few homes on a privatized street to medium-sized cities like 
Reston, Virginia and Columbia, Maryland.  With the dramatic increase in variety, it 
                                                                
69For example, Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder discuss one of the early examples 
of a gated community:  “In England the earliest gated communities were build by the 
occupying Romans around 300 B.C.  Roman soldiers were given land and estates in tribal 
areas after their term of service in the army.... Roman families clustered near or within the 
manor precinct and erected walls....” EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS 
AMERICA:  GATED COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997). 
70EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1994). 
71See generally id. at ch. 2; HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 67, at 19-22. 
72ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 49 (1992). 
73Id. at 50. 
74JAMES DOWDEN, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:  A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1980). 
75See http://www.caionline.org (last visited April 2001). 
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is consequently increasingly difficult to provide a single definition for an RCA or to 
discuss the “nature” or “structure” or “mechanisms of social control” of RCAs 
generally.  Accordingly, I again encourage the reader, in considering the aspects of 
RCAs discussed below, to be mindful of the fact that they are being presented as 
generalized conceptions of this large-scale movement.  While there will no doubt be 
exceptions to nearly every generalization, I remain hopeful that such a general 
discussion will nonetheless provide some utility in providing a sense of the circle of 
community captured by RCAs. 
2.  Community Beliefs or Shared Goals? 
So what is it that unites people, either to create an RCA or to move to one?  What 
puts the “community” in “residential community association”?  To varying degrees, 
those who have studied the RCA movement over the years tend to focus on the 
following aspects:  cost-effective services,76 safety,77 a sense of community inspired 
by the shared use of such facilities as swimming pools and golf courses,78 increased 
participation in local decision-making,79 the aesthetic continuity and regulation of 
use restrictions,80 and the security in future property values felt to be insured by these 
factors.81  (Interestingly, the RCAs themselves tend to emphasize some of these 
features more—or at least more explicitly—than others.82)  However, at the risk of 
redundancy, RCAs are a far more difficult “community” to pinpoint than the 
                                                                
76See, e.g., Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in St. Louis County:  
Subdivisions as Service Providers, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:  PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989) (considering the effectiveness of a street privatization 
scheme, which, dating back to the mid-19th Century, which provides for subdivisions as small 
as just several houses along a single street, together having contracted for their own service 
provision). 
77For a somewhat tongue-in-cheek discussion of the safety benefits of RCAs, in particular 
gated communities, see BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 69, at 18, 99-124.  The authors also 
note that “[a] 1990 survey of southern California home shoppers found that 54 percent wanted 
a gated, walled development....” Id. at 7.  Though this is not necessarily an indication that 
these home shoppers wanted to live in walled developments for the sake of improved safety, 
common sense suggests that for most of these shoppers, safety must have been at least a 
strongly contributing factor to this preference. 
78See, e.g., CARL NORCROSS, TOWNHOUSES & CONDOMINIUMS: RESIDENTS’ LIKES AND 
DISLIKES (1973). 
79See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1375 (1994) (considering the benefits of RCAs, highlights their ability to increase resident 
input in the community decision-making and community character-determining processes). 
80See http://www.caionline.org/about/explanation.cfm (last visited April 2001). 
81
“Preservation of property values is the highest social goal [within RCAs], to which other 
aspects of community life are subordinated.” MCKENZIE, supra note 70, at 19. 
82It is interesting in this regard to explore various RCA web sites.  Though I have not 
conducted an exhaustive study, it appears they attempt to emphasize both these types of 
relations.  If interested in exploring these sites, a helpful place to start is at the Community 
Associations Institute web site, which includes a series of links to all its members’ sites, at 
http://www.caionline.org/about/hoalinks.cfm (last visited April 2001). 
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communities in Section I.  From one Association to another, as the size, shape, 
location and populations change dramatically, so too will the degrees to which each 
of these features is emphasized, promoted, perceived, or achieved.  Thus, we may 
consider this list neither as exhaustive of all desirable attributes of RCAs generally, 
nor as necessary features of a given RCA.  Instead, let it serve as a loose, informal, 
generalized list of the purposes—what we might lump together as “shared values and 
goals”— behind many RCAs.83 
Keeping the above list of “shared values and goals” in mind, perhaps the most 
significant, and surely the most universal, of all attributes of RCAs generally is that 
membership is of a contractual nature.  Unlike a person’s submission to local 
government, which will necessarily occur, to one local government or another, 
submission to (i.e. the decision to live in) a RCA is strictly voluntary.84  In even 
                                                                
83Much has been made in comparing these incentives, these “shared values and goals”, to 
those of the sorts of communities in Section I.  Many such comparisons turn on the 
gemeinschaft/gesellschaft and instrumental/affective/moral distinctions described above.  
Some scholars of RCAs focus on the relative lack of affective, interpersonal relations or 
gemeinschaft functions, emphasizing instead their gesellschaftian and instrumental contractual 
basis and service-supply focus.  Others, however, consider this one-sided approach overstated.  
They point out the potential gemeinschaft and affective qualities that within an RCA can forge 
strong interpersonal bonds.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:  
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1989) (advocating a 
combination approach to understanding RCAs, pointing  out that while they may be 
contractually created, an analysis of them based solely on a contractarian, public choice 
perspective ignores the interpersonal, gemeinschaftian insights often attributed to the 
Communitarian school). 
In considering the features of RCA life below, it might be useful to keep in mind the 
following questions.  Do RCAs, as many critics contend, have a relatively stronger focus on 
gesellschaft relations, rather than gemeinschaft relations, than the communities in Section I? 
As compared to cities generally?  Do the potential members of RCAs put more emphasis in 
their decision-making process on instrumental, rather than affective or moral incentives?  I 
have no intent to argue that one type of relations, or one kind of group orientation, makes for a 
stronger, better, or more just community than others.  Rather, I hope only to illuminate the 
differences between RCAs and the communities in Part I. 
84For a fascinating debate on the relative voluntariness of RCA and city membership 
between two of the foremost legal scholars in the field of local government and RCAs, see 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); and Robert C. 
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982), as well as 
the Comments and Replies which follow. Additionally, James L. Winokur argues that 
voluntariness in RCAs is limited by the fact that oftentimes purchasers are not fully aware of 
the restrictions and obligations that come with membership.  He writes: “Purchasers of 
servitude regime properties are often oblivious to applicable servitude documents, which in 
many states need not be called to a purchaser’s attention or even be recorded in order to 
remain binding.  Servitude documentation is long, technical, boring reading for lay persons, 
who rarely retain attorneys to review home purchase documents.” James L. Winokur, 
Association-Administered Servitude Regimes: A Private Property Perspective, in RESIDENTIAL 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:  PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 85, 
87 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).  The large number 
of legal disputes over the enforcement of these servitudes, an issue discussed later in this 
section, is perhaps an indication of the validity and significance of this argument.  Finally, 
Robert Jay Dilger argues that because, “in many areas of the country RCAs now dominate the 
local housing market and are increasingly offering fairly uniform levels and types of services,” 
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starker contrast, and directly related to the comparative purpose of this paper, unlike 
the informal submission to the authority of a community like those in Section I, 
membership in an RCA—along with the rights and responsibilities of membership—
is documented and memorialized in writing.  It is this writing, this enumeration of 
“can’s” and “cannot’s”, this balancing of rights between the association and the 
individual, as memorialized in the governing documents, that distinguishes the RCA 
from the Section I communities.  As I intend to make clearer throughout this Section, 
the “shared values and goals” that help to define the RCAs may be termed as 
follows:  a cooperative but rights-protective pursuit of individual, instrumental goals.  
3.  Communalism 
The communities of Section I shared some aspect of communalism.  Though the 
Oneida was more literally formal than the Amish, in the sense of strictly shared 
possessions, they both present what might be considered a broader sense of 
“communalism,” in their feelings of interconnectedness and interdependence among 
members.  It was in part this communalism that allowed the Section I communities to 
merge gemeinschaft and gesellschaft functions, such that even the most menial and 
necessary of tasks worked to increase and strengthen interpersonal ties among 
members.  RCAs present a different version of communalism—one that is in some 
sense more literally communal than, for example, Amish communalism (e.g. the 
possibility of shared ownership); but also one that is generally quite limited—
arguably an interdependence or interconnectedness that extends no further than 
would be found outside the RCAs in mainstream America. 
The basis of RCA communalism—in the very literal meaning of the word—lies 
in the sharing of facilities and services.  As discussed above, RCAs come in a variety 
of forms, shapes, and sizes.   One commonality, though, regardless of the legal 
structure of the Association, is that, in addition to the ownership of an individual 
residential unit, members gain access to, and therefore pay assessment fees for, 
common facilities and services.85  The extent and range of provided common 
facilities and services varies greatly from one RCA to another.86  Also, RCAs’ 
CC&Rs generally provide a quite rigorous set of rules and regulations, covering 
everything from guidelines for use of common areas, to mandatory external design 
                                                          
consumer choice does not really benefit from the proliferation of RCAs as much as it may 
seem in the abstract. DILGER, supra note 72, at 38. 
85Recall that under certain legal structures the common areas, and similarly the 
responsibilities and liabilities of shared services, are owned jointly in common interest by all 
members.  In other legal structures, the Association itself owns the common areas with 
members contractually responsible for paying dues to the Association for upkeep. 
86For example, in a 1989 joint U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations-Community Association Institute study of 422 CAI-member RCAs nationwide, 16 
percent of respondents reported providing a lake or beach; 33 percent provide “play areas/tot 
lots;” 59 percent provide sidewalks; 67 percent provide a swimming pool; 45 percent provide 
tennis courts; 38 percent provide an indoor community center; and 37 percent have gates or 
fences.  As for services, aside for the maintenance of the above indicated shared facilities, 72 
percent provide trash collection; 48 provide snow removal; 31 percent provide security patrol; 
and 65 provide street repair.  RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY 
ASSOCIATIONS:  PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 13 (U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). 
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features of individual residencies.  Not only does this likely inspire a sense of shared 
lifestyle that might be considered a “communal feeling,” but it is also an indication 
of the shared sense of importance placed on property value maintenance.87  Finally, 
as will be discussed below, increased resident participation in decision-making is 
often offered as a perk of RCA life.88  In all of these ways, then, a sense of 
interdependence, if not “communalism,” may generally be perceived in RCAs. 
In understanding this list of communal features, however, what stands out is not 
so much those features that are included, but rather those that are seen in the Section 
I communities but are not apparent in RCAs.  There is no ambition within RCAs to 
promote Association-wide primary groups.89  Similarly, the mutual assistance of the 
Amish is nowhere discussed in the literature on RCAs.  Where the communalism of 
the Section I communities inspired an infusion of gemeinschaft relations and 
affectivity into day to day menial tasks, the type of communalism of RCAs seems 
more strictly gesellschaftian in nature, and more akin to Kanter’s description of 
instrumental goals. Individuals choose to become members, to become contractually 
interconnected to each other, for individual gains—to live in a safer environment, to 
live near a golf course, to maintain stable property values, etc.  Likewise, the civic 
virtue of Association direct democracy seems instrumental as well, to be construed 
not so much as an opportunity to determine what is best for the community as a 
community, but rather what is best for the community, to be divided among and 
enjoyed by individual members.90  Thus, as considered above in regard to the 
contractual nature of Association membership, the communalism of RCAs tends to 
be as, if not more, concerned with the individual benefits of cooperation and group 
living (the instrumental benefits of communal life), than it is with the more 
traditional sense of communalism found in the communities of Section I. 
                                                                
87One of RCA’s major functions “is to protect the neighborhood’s aesthetic and real estate 
values by enforcing the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that are attached to 
each home’s deed.” DILGER, supra note 72, at 23. 
88
“As one of the leading advocates of RCAs has argued, unlike local governments, RCAs 
provide citizens an opportunity to participate directly, at a more manageable scale, in the 
governance of their local neighborhood and community.” Id. at 132. 
89Granted, the level of interpersonal interaction that is likely heightened by the presence of 
common facilities and the “direct democracy” of Association governance potentially increases 
the bonds between members.  However, private ownership of residential units, the contractual 
basis of membership, and the limited isolation from the rest of society, to be considered later 
in this section, reveal that this interpersonal connectedness extends only so far. 
90This is not to ignore the fact that members of the Section I communities, in deciding 
whether to join or to leave the community, likely made their decisions in part based on 
instrumental considerations.  Indeed, Kanter’s work, emphasizing the existence of all three 
orientations, was based in large part on the Oneida Community.  Rather, it is to point out, as 
was done earlier in this section, that there seems to be a somewhat more instrumentalism-
heavy balance of considerations in RCAs (as can be seen, I argue, in the RCA version of 
communalism) than was seen to be the case in the communities of Section I.  This argument 
will be fortified, I hope, throughout the remainder of this Section. 
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4.  Isolation 
As discussed briefly above, RCAs take numerous forms, and are found in all 
sorts of locations across the country.  Some RCAs are “gated communities”, with 
actual, physical barriers isolating their residents from the outside world.91  Others, 
though not literally gated, are nonetheless physically isolated from the outside world, 
either by design (high-rise condominiums, for example92), or location.93  Others still, 
particularly where the Association is retrofitted  into a more urban area (created after 
the residential structures and streets have already been built), construct barricades or 
guard posts at the points where privatized Association roads meet the busier non-
Association streets.94  Some, like Columbia, Maryland or Reston, Virginia, are so 
large95 that average passers-by may have no idea they were in an RCA at all.  
Regardless of the form or layout of a given RCA, what is certain is that it was 
intentionally created, with the goal of separating itself, for any or all of a vast 
number of possible reasons, from others.  In this sense, they all may be considered, 
in some way, and to varying degrees, isolationist.   
For those RCAs without physical barriers, isolation is often achieved in other 
ways.  In a manner similar to the Ordnung’s isolating affect among the Amish, the 
aesthetic, use, and behavior restrictions of Association CC&Rs have what might be 
similarly experienced as an isolating effect.  In many RCAs, for example, residential 
units are limited to a very small number of possible styles, colors and other such 
features, making clear the transition from the outside world to Association property.  
Among those RCAs that were planned prior to building (in contrast to those 
Associations established among already built units), street designs can have a strong 
                                                                
91A 1997 estimate figured there were around 20,000 gated communities, with more than 
three million units.  BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 69, at 7.  It defines a gated community as 
“residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are privatized.  They 
are security developments with designated perimeters, usually walls or fences, and controlled 
entrances that are intended to prevent penetration by nonresidents.”  BLAKELY & SNYDER, 
supra note 69, at 2. 
92In a 1989 survey of RCAs Institute members, nine percent described their building 
structure as a “high-rise” (more than five stories). RCA Characteristics and Issues, in 
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS:  PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 12 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations ed., 1989). 
93Though no statistics are available indicating the percentage of RCAs that are 
geographically isolated, a somewhat helpful indicator may be a 1989 survey of Community 
Association Institute member RCAs, of which 13 percent described their location as “rural.” 
Id. at 11. 
94University City, and Clayton, Missouri, wealthier sections of the St. Louis metropolitan 
area, are notable for their use of access restrictions such as barriers and chains blocking access 
to Association roads.  Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in St. Louis County:  
Subdivisions as Service Providers, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 55, 58-59 (U.S. Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). 
95The populations of Columbia, Maryland and Reston, Virginia stand at around 97,000 
and 55,700, respectively.  COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE (Rand McNally & Co., 
131st ed. 2000). 
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self-containing function.96  While these characteristics may not literally isolate an 
Association (in the sense that outsiders may not be physically barred from entrance), 
they can nonetheless serve as psychologically isolating barriers.   
Where in the Section I communities an informal and unofficial sense of isolation 
and other-ness served as a two-way barrier at the perimeter of their community-
circles, keeping the outside world out and the community members themselves in, 
the isolation of RCAs differs in two significant ways.  First, it is legal in nature—the 
creation of an Association establishes a legal boundary, inside of which is private 
property, owned either collectively or by the Association itself.97  Thus, where the 
stark cultural, linguistic, and symbolic differences that defined and limited Section I 
community members’ interaction with the outside world are less likely to exist 
between Association members and non-members,98 laws of trespass and the like are 
available to serve a similar prophylactic function.  Second, unlike the two-way 
isolation of Section I communities, in which members were not only protected from 
intrusion from without but also were prevented, to varying degrees, from crossing 
the same barriers, RCA isolation appears to be a one-way protection.  Except perhaps 
in the largest RCAs (or, of course, in those populated by retirees), members leave 
every day to work outside of the Association.  Similarly, though Associations may 
advertise the interpersonal bonds to be formed at the RCA swimming pool, or at 
Association meetings, it is highly doubtful that any would go so far as to discourage 
outside contacts.  Likewise, there is no sense of moral superiority within RCAs, as 
was seen in both Section I communities; indeed, in most RCAs, there is likely any 
collectively understood morality by which to differentiate it from the outside world.  
Thus, RCAs do not perpetuate the types of instrumental, affective, and moral barriers 
to exit that exist within the Section I communities.  “Communal” aspects, shared 
instrumental goals and increased participation (considered below) notwithstanding, 
RCA isolation (whether physical, psychological or legal) seems oriented solely 
towards preventing intrusion from without.99 
                                                                
96For example, streets may be constructed to surround the Association property entirely, or 
to be a self-contained offshoot, with but one entrance point.  BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 
69, at 8. 
97But see, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946) (holding that the privately owned town 
in question, due to its size and public nature, is held to the Constitutional standards of a 
publicly owned town). 
98This is perhaps an overstatement.  Many critics of RCAs argue that the exclusionary 
membership practices of some RCAs, most nefariously by race and class, contribute to and 
perpetuate a segregated America.  Thus, where such is the case, one can imagine that obvious 
cultural and symbolic differences do exist between Association members and those who live 
beyond Association boundaries. The segregating effect of RCAs is a hugely significant and 
hotly contested topic in land use and local government policy.  However, as it falls somewhat 
outside the scope of this paper,  I regrettably decline to discuss beyond this brief mention the 
external effects of RCAs and their membership practices.  For very compelling assertions of 
this argument, see generally, MCKENZIE, supra note 70; and BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 
69. 
99This too, though perhaps true in its most literal sense, is still probably something of an 
exaggeration.  Just as the existence of cultural differences between some RCAs and their 
environs likely work to keep out those who “don’t belong,” those sharp differences, one can 
imagine, might also work to reinforce and perhaps exaggerate the us-and-them sentiment felt 
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5.  Organizational Structure 
It would be impossible to discuss the many variations of RCA organizational and 
decision-making structures.  Instead, much as I have done throughout this section, I 
will attempt to focus on generalities—on how Association “government” tends to be 
structured.  In this vein, it is perhaps most convenient in embarking on this 
generalized description, to conceive of the Association much like a corporation, 
complete with a board of directors and officers.  Likewise, property owners, 100  who 
upon purchase automatically and compulsorily become Association members, can be 
thought of as shareholders.101  Yet, where a shareholder’s interest in corporation 
decisions is generally purely fiscal, an RCA’s decisions often affect the daily lives of 
members in a much broader and more personal sense.  Association governance 
focuses on three broad areas: management of commonly owned or shared property 
and facilities, provision of services, and enforcement of the CC&Rs, which regulate 
behavior, uses, and aesthetics.102  It is in this broad litany of Association powers and 
responsibilities, and their penetrating effects on members’ day-to-day lives, that the 
debate over the nature of Association governance, as either a private corporation-like 
entity or a quasi-public “private government,” finds its fuel.103  It is also these same 
powers, and the increased decision-making participation the RCA form of 
                                                          
within the Community.  As Dennis Judd writes, “the trappings of security that impregnate the 
new walled communities must [remind] the inhabitants, constantly and repetitively, that the 
world beyond their walls is dangerous.”  Dennis R. Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities, 
in SPATIAL PRACTICES: CRITICAL EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL/SPATIAL THEORY 144, 161 (Helen 
Liggett & David C. Perry eds., 1995). 
100The possibility of membership and thus voting and participation rights for renting 
tenants (as opposed to property owners) has been widely debated.  See, e.g., supra note 84 for 
a discussion of the Ellickson-Frug debate. 
101Another consequence of the public-private debate discussed in FN 84 is the potential 
Constitutional uncertainty surrounding RCA voting schemes.  Will the one person-one vote 
rule of Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) apply?  Currently, many RCAs grant voting 
rights based on property ownership, either by the number of properties, the amount of property 
(square feet, etc.), or value of property.  See, e.g., Katherine Rosenberry, Condominium and 
Homeowner Associations: Should They Be Treated Like ‘Mini-Governments?,’ in 
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 69, 72 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations ed., 1989). 
102DILGER, supra note 72, at 1.   
103As discussed above, this public-private debate permeates much of the RCA scholarship.  
Aside from the issues related to this debate considered above (FN 83), the public-private 
distinction also holds consequences for possible Association governance liability.  In 
members’ suits against the Association, courts have wavered in the standard by which they 
judge Association action.  Though courts typically attempt to distinguish between business 
decisions (which invoke corporation law-type standards, like the Business Judgment Rule), 
and “governmental” decisions (calling for some version of a Reasonableness standard), there 
is often a significant gray area blurring this important distinction.  For more, see HYATT & 
FRENCH, supra note 67, at 319-25; WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM LAW 9, 10 (1984). 
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governance makes possible, that contributes to many decisions to become 
members.104 
The governing documents included in the deed of sale are the backbone of RCA 
government.  They define not only who is a member (almost universally, property 
owners), but also the rights and responsibilities of membership.  Much in the same 
way as a corporation’s articles of incorporation and by-laws determine the rules, 
rights and responsibilities for shareholders, as well as the limits of power and legal 
liabilities of the board of directors and officers, the governing documents of the RCA 
(the Declaration, Articles of Incorporation, By-laws, etc.105) serve the same function 
for the Association.  They will generally provide for election processes and term 
guidelines for representation on the Board and as Officers; they will lay out rules for 
having meetings and for notice-of-meeting requirements; they will determine which 
decisions may be made by the Board alone, and which may only be made upon a 
vote of the membership as a whole.106  Thus, while the size of a given Board, or the 
number of Officers, or the amount of responsibility placed on each member varies 
greatly from Association to Association, in the most general terms, the form of 
governance in RCAs may be said to be a corporation-style representative democracy, 
as based on and carefully outlined in the “voluntarily” signed and assented to 
governing documents. 
6.  Enforcement and Litigation 
Throughout this section I have endeavored through comparison to the Section I 
communities, to consider the significant differences between the nature of those 
                                                                
104Though this increased participation is often hyped by RCAs, and is also promoted on a 
theoretical level by many scholars, survey studies have found that membership participation in 
Association governance may not be so prominent.  A 1989 study of 579 RCA board presidents 
found that “[t]he median percentage of people serving on boards, committees, or in some 
voluntary basis was 11 percent. . . .  In 16 percent of the associations, fewer people ran for the 
board in the last election than the number of seats open.” Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. 
Silverman, The Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners’ Associations, in RESIDENTIAL 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 31, 
35 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). 
105
“The recorded declaration of covenants for the community may include the articles of 
incorporation and bylaws for the homeowners’ association, or they may incorporate them by 
reference.  The declaration of covenants together with . . . the articles of incorporation and the 
bylaws for the association are known as the ‘governing documents’ for the community.  
Together, the governing documents combine to set out both the powers and the limitations on 
the powers of the homeowners’ association.”  PETER M. DUNBAR & CHARLES F. DUDLEY, LAW 
OF FLORIDA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 9 (Suncoast Professional Publishing Corp., 3d ed. 
1997). 
106RCAs generally grant wide latitude to their Board of Directors and Officers in carrying 
out Association functions.  Hyatt and French provide the following as an example of how an 
Association’s by-laws might provide for such Board discretion:  “The Board of Directors shall 
be responsible for the affairs of the Association and shall have all the powers and duties 
necessary for the administration of the Association’s affairs and, as provided by law, may do 
all acts and things as are not by the Declaration, Articles, or these By-laws directed to be done 
and exercised exclusively by the members. . . .”  HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 67, at 295.  For 
a more detailed picture of the roles and responsibilities of the Board of Directors, Officers, and 
members generally, at least as is the case in Florida, see DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 105. 
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communities and that of RCAs generally.  Perhaps the most telling difference, and 
one that exists, at least in theory, in all Associations, may be found in the typical 
RCA mechanism for social control.  The formal, contractual nature of RCAs—from 
membership, to the rights and responsibilities of members, to the rules and 
restrictions that order much of Association life—unlike the communities of Section 
I, ultimately requires and relies on external enforcement mechanisms.  Thus, “[w]hen 
a resident fails to conform to an association’s rules, or challenges an association’s 
actions, either the resident or the association is likely to invoke the power of the 
outside government to void or enforce the covenants and bylaws that define the 
association’s power.”107  It is the very nature of the contractual basis of RCAs, rather 
than the generally informal, unwritten, or perhaps even unspoken understandings of 
the Section I communities, that acknowledges the potential need for external 
enforcement and dispute resolution.108 
As considered briefly above, the notion that Association membership is entirely 
voluntary has been cast in doubt.  From misperceptions of mandatory regulations and 
responsibilities, to the coercive effects of a housing market dominated by RCAs, 
there is no certainty that every member of a given Association will be willing, years 
into the future, to comply with every facet of the Association’s rules and 
requirements.  Were such universal compliance that certain, there would be no need 
for covenants to begin with.109  It is therefore in the very existence, and from 
Association to Association in the specific and often complex wording, of the 
governing documents, that the means of covenant enforcement is made known.110  To 
be sure, each Association’s enforcement procedures are different.111  To avoid where 
                                                                
107Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 485 (1985-
1986) [hereinafter Note]. 
108It is doubtless that informal social control, in the form of social pressure, gossip, and the 
like, is in effect in every RCA, much as it is anywhere in society.  The absence of discussion 
of such informal controls from the literature on RCAs is, I imagine, to some degree due simply 
to the nature of the field.  Where literature on the communities of Section I tends to take a 
more anthropological approach, it is my experience that the literature on RCAs comes from a 
more formal, legal and sociopolitical orientation.  The more important point, however, is that 
while such informal social control may exist, Associations nonetheless feel the need to draft 
and implement written rules and procedures to be enforced by external forces, where the 
communities of Section I do not. 
109
“If residential associations were simply voluntary associations, there would be no need 
of rules and covenants; in fact, however, they are also coercive associations.”  Note, supra 
note 107, at 490. 
110
“The provisions of the declaration of covenants are enforceable as equitable servitudes, 
and they are covenants and restrictions with which the association, each officer and director of 
the association and each parcel owner and their visitors and guests must comply.” DUNBAR & 
DUDLEY, supra note 105, at 89. 
111To again return to the Constitutional uncertainties surrounding the public-private 
debate, courts have on numerous occasions either invalidated or refused to enforce RCAs’ 
rules and enforcement procedures.  In finding invalid particular Associations’ regulations, the 
Courts have sometimes followed Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), restricting 
Association action (particularly in the largest, most self-sufficient RCAs) to the tighter 
standards of public governments.  Elsewhere, in following the reasoning in Shelley v. 
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possible the high costs of litigation, many use as an initial enforcement mechanism 
the imposition either of fines or suspensions of privileges for the use of common 
facilities.112  Significantly, most Associations provide for and ensure hearings, upon 
proper and sufficient notice, at which the alleged violator is given the opportunity to 
be heard in his or her own defense.113  Where such self-help is ineffective, many 
Association guidelines mandate the conflicting parties to participate in ADR before 
entering the courthouse.114 
Regardless of the specific processes, hovering in the background of any RCA 
enforcement process is the threat of litigation, and, where the Association prevails in 
court, the uniquely coercive external force of the State.  And lying at the heart of the 
legal system are the liberal ideals of moral neutrality and individual liberty and 
autonomy.115  Unlike the overwhelmingly group-oriented social control mechanisms 
of the Section I communities, the litigation process aspires more neutrally to balance 
the RCAs’ need for rule enforcement and group harmony with the dissenting 
member’s individual rights.116  Because RCAs have little or none of the moral 
orientation (and thus generally no affirmative moral or religious consensus) found in 
the Section I communities, the external force of the courts is favored by RCAs and 
their members for its perceived moral neutrality and objectivity.  Likewise, without 
the strong group cohesiveness and affectivity found in the Section I communities, 
social pressure is not only undesired, but also, even were it a wanted form of 
                                                          
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (though with varying degrees of strictness), Courts have refused 
to enforce certain restrictive covenants, holding that the very act of enforcement would 
constitute violative state action.  See, e.g., Note, supra note 107.  Katharine Rosenberry, 
Condominium And Homeowner Associations:  Should They Be Treated Like ‘Mini-
Governments?,’ in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 69 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations ed., 1989).  Aside from these instances, however, perhaps the more greatly 
impacting factor in informing the drafting of enforcement procedures is simply the free market 
laws of supply and demand—Associations want to draft procedures that, when considered by 
potential members (to the extent they in fact are considered), seem fair and reasonable. 
112See, e.g., DUNBAR & DUDLEY, supra note 105, at 91. 
113Id. at 92. 
114For example, in response to growing numbers of suits between RCAs and their 
members, Montgomery County, Maryland, has established a non-binding, mandatory 
mediation/arbitration program in which all RCA disputants must participate before moving 
into the courts. RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 9, 19 (U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). 
115See, e.g.,  Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 64 (Michael 
Sandel ed., 1984) (arguing that liberal equality requires “that government must be neutral on 
what might be considered the question of the good life.”). 
116Courts have voided member-challenged covenants and servitudes for a number of 
reasons, including, but not limited to, when they are found to be the following:  (1) racially 
restrictive (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); (2) arbitrary, in having no rational 
relationship to the purpose of the affected land (Laguna Royale Owners Association v. Darger, 
174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)); and (3) unreasonable, in imposing burdens on the 
use of lands that substantially outweighs the restriction’s benefits (Nahrstedt v. Lakeside 
Village Condominium Association, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994)). 
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informal deviance control, it would likely be far less effective.  Finally, with a level 
of isolation far less than that of the Oneida or Amish, the consequences of deviance 
for RCA members, even at their worst, are nowhere near the life-altering levels of 
Section I community members.  The social control function of RCAs may be 
classified as an external, liberal, rights-based, individualized one because of its 
contrasts to the Section I communities, its full array of Due Process concerns, and its 
(at least perceived) aspiration to objectively apply laws to formalized categories of 
facts. 
7.  Summary 
So what, then, does this reliance on litigation and external enforcement mean?  
Why is it such a significant point of departure from those communities in Section I?  
In answering this question, one needs only to reconsider Kanter’s three group 
orientations. As I hope to have by now made clear, membership and participation in 
RCAs—on the whole—are primarily focussed on Kanter’s “instrumental 
orientation.”  Granted, emotional, interpersonal, affective orientations at least 
sometimes have a role in members’ decisions whether to join or remain in RCAs; as 
discussed above, these affective qualities are both hotly advertised and to some 
degree successfully realized features of RCA life.117  It is my contention, however, 
that the major factors in such membership decisions are individualistic, rights-based, 
instrumental considerations:  property values, cost-effective services, safety, 
aesthetics.118  Individuals join RCAs for the individual benefits that membership 
provides.  And thus it is this cooperative endeavor for mutually agreeable individual 
benefit that unites the community.  Unlike the Section I communities, there is little 
sense that the whole is anything more than the sum of its parts.  There is no shared 
belief system beyond the liberal individualism laid out in the rights-ordering 
governing documents119 to empower the community on the basis of its collective 
                                                                
117I remain somewhat skeptical about the frequency and intensity of these emotional 
interpersonal relationships.  Most basically, it should be remembered that people join RCAs 
generally without knowing the other members.  Stephen E. Barton and Carol J. Silverman 
discuss a number of factors that from their research of numerous RCAs they believe to 
contribute to social barriers between members.  Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, The 
Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners’ Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY 
ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 31 (U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989). 
118I would like to make very clear that my intention in distinguishing between these 
“individualistic, right-based, instrumental considerations”, and those more “group-oriented” is 
not to disparage RCAs or their members.  It would be foolish to think that we all could find 
our own Oneida Community—and for those of us (the vast majority!) who do not find comfort 
in a community like those of Section I, the liberalism and right-oriented, yet cooperative 
nature of the RCA may be quite appealing.  Accordingly, I am simply trying to point out what 
I consider a major difference between two different (and equally potentially legitimate) 
community types. 
119I use the term “liberal” here with caution.  It is quite possible that the restrictions of the 
“rights-ordering governing documents” may be quite non-liberal indeed.  As discussed above, 
RCAs distinguish themselves from each other on numerous bases, quite likely sometimes to 
include notions of shared values and the “non-liberal” enforcement of them.  Rather, I use 
“liberal” to point out that these potentially non-liberal restrictions are (at least in theory) 
known to the potential members.  Thus, where potential members have the freedom to choose 
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moral strength to reprimand a wayward member.  Where an RCA member finds a 
particular restriction too onerous, he or she will deviate from it without concern for 
defying the moral authority.  Likewise, where the Association’s implementation of 
the external social control function is perceived as sufficiently threatening, the 
threatened member, on the basis of an individually/instrumentally-oriented analysis, 
will either conform or quit the community.120  Far less severe among most RCAs are 
the moral, affective, and instrumental barriers that prevent individuals’ exit from the 
Section I communities—there is no strong moral orientation, casting a notion of 
moral/religious inferiority over the outside world; and there is no intense isolation, 
disabling members from either relating to people or functionally making a living 
beyond the boundaries of their community-circle. 
It is no great surprise that where it is these rights-based interests that compel 
membership, rather than the shared community beliefs or strong interpersonal 
relations and interdependence—Kanter’s moral and affective orientations—more 
frequently found in the Section I communities, protection of those rights is perceived 
as necessary.121  And to protect their rights when conflict arises, RCAs and their 
members look, ultimately, to the state-backed coercive power of the courts.  Indeed, 
one could further argue that the very act of entering by covenant into an RCA is a 
significant symbolic gesture emphasizing the contractual nature of the community at 
the expense of the affective or moral possibilities.122  Where membership within the 
Section I communities is likely attracted and maintained on the basis of moral and 
affective orientations (“These are my people”, “This is my lifestyle”, “This is the 
right way to live”), this same function within RCAs is probably more heavily 
oriented towards individualistic instrumentalism.  Thus we see that, just as was the 
                                                          
from numerous communities—with knowledge of the restrictions and potential non-liberal 
leanings of each community—they enjoy a liberal freedom, as Charles Tiebout might say, “to 
vote with their feet.” Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). 
120And recall, as discussed briefly above, that for RCA members the side of the equation 
warning against deviance—the consequences of deviance and possible alienation or 
excommunication—does not compare to the respective cautioning factors for members of the 
Section I communities. 
121This is not to ignore the point that  liberalism itself may be considered a “shared 
community belief.”  Indeed, this idea will be considered in a more head-on fashion below.  For 
purposes of this Section, I wish only to make the distinction between the “shared community 
belief” of liberalism and the “shared community beliefs” of the Section I communities.  As I 
find this distinction a relatively intuitive one to make, but a far more difficult one to put 
fruitfully into words, perhaps it will suffice to make the following hypothetical observation:  it 
is far easier to imagine a Communitarian living happily in an RCA than it is to imagine a 
liberal atheist living happily among the Amish.  In fact, two scholars of the RCA movement 
have noted that the behavior of members is not always so liberal to begin with, finding in their 
study of numerous RCAs that “[m]embers support the restrictions inherent in the CID as they 
apply to others, but resent the restrictions on their own activities.”  Barton & Silverman, supra 
note 117, at 31, 35. 
122See, e.g., James L. Winokur, Rejoinder: Reforming Servitude Regimes: Toward 
Associational Federalism And Community, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 537 (1990) (in part lamenting at 
least one example of what he perceives as an unfortunate reliance on legal remedies, rather 
than informal, interpersonal ones, for RCA members’ conflicts). 
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case with the communities of Section I, it is the core community values of RCAs—
the cooperative but rights-protective pursuit of liberal, individualistic and 
instrumental goals—that informs the RCA model of social control.  And yet at the 
same time, the use of this rights-based, liberal social control mechanism works to 
protect and perpetuate those same core values.  In this sense, just as the social control 
mechanisms of Section I were symbiotically related to the natures and functions of 
those communities and the collective ideologies that formed them, so too does the 
external, liberal, rights-based social control of RCAs both rely on and perpetuate an 
individualistic, instrumental, rights-oriented mentality and a predominantly 
gesellschaft nature. 
IV.  SECTION III. 
A.  Harvard College 
1.  Background123 
Harvard College was founded in 1636, named for its first donor, the Reverend 
John Harvard, who left to the school his personal library and half his estate.  The 
College expanded into a multi-disciplinary university during the late-18th and 19th 
Centuries, beginning with the creation of a medical studies graduate program in 
1782, law and divinity programs in 1816 and 1817, respectively, and a main library 
building in 1841.  The University continued to grow throughout the 20th Century: the 
professional schools acquired new buildings over its first three decades;  Widener 
Library was constructed in 1915; The Fogg Museum was built in 1927.  In 1943, the 
instruction of Radcliffe124 undergraduates became the formal responsibility of the 
Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and over the next three years nearly all 
courses were made coeducational.  Twenty years later, Radcliffe graduates were 
awarded Harvard degrees.  In 1999, the merger of the two schools was effectively 
completed, as Harvard College assumed full responsibility for the education of 
undergraduate women, and Radcliffe College was transformed into the Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study, a non-degree-conferring interdisciplinary center for 
advanced study across an array of fields.  
Today, Harvard University consists of Harvard College, the Graduate School of 
Arts and Sciences, as well eight other full faculties.  Its campus area, split between 
Cambridge and Boston, covers about 500 acres.  The University has a regular 
enrollment of approximately 17,000 full time students, and a faculty and staff 
numbering about 20,000.  It is likely the single most recognized and well-known 
academic institution in the world. 
                                                                
123All the information in this Background subsection was obtained from the Harvard 
University web site, at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/ 
introduction.html (last visited March 1, 2002).   
124Radcliffe College, Harvard College’s sister-school, was founded in 1879.  See 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, STUDENT HANDBOOK, at 
http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/introduction.html (last visited March 
1, 2002). 
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2.  Individualism and Self-Realization 
Harvard College, like any college, is more than a simple collection of classes, 
students and teachers.  It is a particular and intentionally created and maintained 
environment, and within that environment it is an academic community.  Unlike the 
less formally established communities of Section I,125 Harvard College is a single 
community with available, official statements of purpose and goals.  For example, as 
stated in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences Student Handbook: 
A fundamental goal of the College is to foster an environment in which its 
members may live and work productively together, making use of the rich 
resources of the University, in individual and collective pursuit of 
academic excellence, extracurricular accomplishment, and personal 
challenge.  In the words of the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities 
adopted by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences on April 14, 1970, ‘By 
accepting membership in the University, an individual joins a community 
ideally characterized by free expression, free inquiry, intellectual honesty, 
respect for the dignity of others, and openness to constructive change.’ 
For this goal to be achieved, the community must be a tolerant and 
supportive one, characterized by civility and consideration for others  
Therefore the standards and expectations of this community are high, as 
much so in the quality of interpersonal relationships as they are in 
academic performance.126 
The above statement provides insight into the dualism and potentially conflicting 
ambitions of the Harvard College community.  Many of the ideal characterizations 
above—“free expression,” “free inquiry”—may be labeled as liberal, individualistic 
ones.  Meanwhile, others of the aspirations—“to foster an environment in which its 
members may live and work productively together . . . in individual and collective 
pursuit of . . . excellence . . .”—hint at the communalism and group orientation of the 
Section I communities.  As I hope the discussion in this Section will show, the 
Harvard College community is an interesting mixture of the instrumentalism and 
right-based gesellschaft relations common to the RCA’s, and the group-oriented, 
ideology-based gemeinschaft orientation that marks the Section I communities. 
Where most RCA’s are predominantly gesellschaft-based, formed around 
cooperative, corporation-like efforts to realize individual aims, Harvard College 
(though not without its instrumentalism and solely instrumentally-minded 
members127) puts particular emphasis on interpersonal interaction and exploration.  
Indeed, the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities, cited above, raises this 
                                                                
125The College’s charter, under which it still operates today, was granted by the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1650, with subsequent amendment and further definition in the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.  See id. 
126FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, FAS HANDBOOK ch. 4 (2001) (italics added). 
127Though instrumental orientations take numerous forms, some likely examples to be 
found among Harvard College community members might include the following: the future 
personal benefits of a Harvard degree, desire to please parents and family, wanting to live in 
the Boston area, etc. 
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aspiration for the collective creation of a “super-liberal” environment arguably to the 
level of an ideology:  “The University . . . has a special autonomy and reasoned 
dissent plays a particularly vital part in its existence. . . .  The University must affirm, 
assure and protect the rights of its members to organize and join political 
associations, convene and conduct public meetings, publicly demonstrate and picket 
in orderly fashion, advocate, and publicize opinion by print, sign, and voice.”128  
Some RCAs may come close to this conception of a collectively created and 
maintained environment.  But where RCAs as a whole can reasonably be analogized 
to a corporation (and the essentially faceless, though cooperative, relationship 
between shareholders/RCA-members), it is an essential characteristic of the Harvard 
College community that its members share (rather than merely cooperate) in the 
formation of a particular environment. 
Yet while Harvard College may not be the strictly gesellschaftian community 
that many RCAs may be, it also does not fit neatly into the group of communities in 
Section I.  This is so mainly for three different reasons.  First, though Harvard does 
share with those communities a strong focus and reliance on shared beliefs, it is the 
nature of these beliefs that distinguishes it.  Unlike the Section I communities’ 
emphasis on submission to the group, the underlying ideology that unites the 
Harvard community is, in the goal it envisions, essentially an individualistic one—
the shared aspiration towards, and collective maintenance of an environment that 
promotes, individualistically-minded self-realization.  Second, for a number of 
reasons to be considered more fully below (the transient nature of the student body, 
existing external ties, family pressure, to name just three), Harvard College 
community members are likely to place more weight on the instrumental purposes 
behind their membership than their Section I counterparts.  And third, also due to 
Harvard College’s less intense level of isolation, the consequences of student 
deviance—and the risk of alienation or perhaps expulsion from the community—is 
surely understood in far less drastic terms as it is among the members of the Section 
I communities.  It is thus my contention that the Harvard College community is a 
unique synthesis of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft:  it is a community of both 
instrumental and non-instrumental orientations, bound by the community-wide 
creation of an environment amenable to the collective ideological aspiration of 
individualistic self-realization. 
3.  Communalism 
The communalism of Harvard College is a blend of the many variations on 
communalism that have been considered thus far.  Like the RCAs, the members of 
the Harvard College community enjoy the shared use of common facilities and 
services—from athletic facilities to libraries to computer services to common grassy 
areas like the Harvard Yard.129  While these common areas and facilities may not be 
                                                                
128Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities, approved and signed by the Faculty of Arts 
and Sciences on April 14, 1970.  See HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, 
RESOLUTION ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1970), at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/ 
handbooks/student/chapter4/community.html [hereinafter RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES]. 
129HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE 
USE OF UNIVERSITY RESOURCES, at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/ 
handbooks/student/chapter4/conduct.html (last visited March 1, 2002) (including a section on 
regulations concerning the use of university resources, focussing most particularly on 
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owned by the students—and are accordingly less likely to inspire as deep a sense of 
interconnected responsibility for their maintenance as would be found in most 
RCAs—their common use of and often significant reliance on these facilities are 
likely to engender, if not economic interdependence, some sense of social 
interconnectedness and communalism. 
Like the Oneida Community, Harvard College students live together,130 eat meals 
together, attend classes together, and often spend most of their extracurricular time 
together as well.  Though Harvard College is not literally self-sufficient in the 
Oneidan sense (no food is produced, etc.), the level of service provision and the 
variety of outlets, pursuits, and activities available within the community make it 
possible for its members to remain within the campus indefinitely.  In this sense, the 
College may be compared not only to the Oneida, but also to at least some of the 
more self-contained RCAs. 
However, unlike the Oneida, who endeavored to create a community-wide 
primary group, Harvard College is subdivided in numerous different ways.  Most 
significantly, there are more than 6700 College students.131  Though the College 
campus is relatively compact compared to many American colleges, at almost no 
time are all the members of the Harvard College community together in the same 
room or outdoor area.  Rather, the community is divided into classes.  And probably 
more significantly, aside from first-year students it is divided among the Houses 
(discussed below).  Academic areas of concentration, extracurricular activities and 
clubs, and other informal divisions also work to create subgroups within the 
community.  Also, unlike all the Section I communities, and perhaps also unlike 
RCAs, the Harvard College student community is a transient one, as very few 
students remain members for more than four years.  One imagines that this factor 
could not help but limit the intensity of interconnectedness and communal 
responsibility felt between students. 
Yet while the transience of the community members, and the numerous divisions 
within the community as a whole, may serve in some way to diminish the overall 
sense of communalism at Harvard College, there are a number of significant 
commonalities among most, if not all, students that combats these de-communalizing 
factors.  Perhaps most significantly (and found to this degree in none of the other 
communities above, except perhaps for some particularly specialized RCAs), there is 
a homogeneity of age among College community members.  Though this fact alone 
by no means ensures any increased sense of communalism, it likely leads to a 
heightened similarity in tastes, activities, and interests that serve to enhance 
communalism.  Similarly, this homogeneity of age (in the sense that the majority of 
community members are young adults, generally living on their own away from 
home for the first extended period of time) also works to emphasize the shared 
ambition towards self-realization discussed above.  In consideration of this 
aspiration, the Resolution on Rights and Responsibilities (cited in the block quote 
                                                          
regulating use of the libraries and computer networks, but also on activity in common areas, 
for example prohibiting bicycle riding in Harvard Yard.  College rules and regulations like 
these are quite similar to those concerning regulation of common facility use of the RCA’s). 
130All but a very few undergraduates live in on-campus dormitory housing. THE INSIDER’S 
GUIDE TO THE COLLEGES 426 (2001). 
131Id. at 424. 
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss2/5
2001] THE SYMBIOTIC CIRCLE OF COMMUNITY 313 
above), places special emphasis on the following rights-based freedoms: “freedom of 
speech and academic freedom, freedom from personal force and violence, and 
freedom of movement,” such that “[i]nterference with these freedoms must be 
regarded as a serious violation of the personal rights upon which the community is 
based.”132  Thus, to summarize, communalism may be perceived at Harvard College 
in four ways:  (1) communal living and shared facilities and common grounds; (2) 
the self-contained nature of campus life; (3) the relatively homogenous nature of 
student community members; and (4) the common, cooperative and 
interdependent—albeit individualized—pursuit of self-realization.  With these four 
characteristics in mind, we can see how Harvard College’s brand of communalism is 
a neat blend of both the gesellschaft-oriented, cooperative communalism of most 
RCAs, and the more gemeinschaft-inspired and –inspiring version of the Amish and 
Oneida. 
4.  Isolation 
Harvard College is located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a city of more than 
90,000 people,133 directly across the Charles River from Boston.  Though many of 
the College’s buildings are scattered throughout the Harvard Square area of 
Cambridge, the heart of the College—those buildings on and around Harvard Yard—
is enclosed by a series of metal gates.  Presumably, anyone may pass through these 
gates and into the yard.  Yet, their mere presence (and that of the Harvard University 
campus police officers regularly positioned at the major gate openings) surely has 
some affect on both Harvard College students and non-students alike.  Additionally, 
beyond the gates, some College buildings, the residence Houses in particular, posses 
similar external features likely to indicate to passers-by an affiliation with Harvard.  
In part because of these distinctively collegiate buildings and external features, as 
well as Harvard’s long history and renown, Harvard University (and particularly the 
College) takes on an almost ubiquitous presence in the Harvard Square area of 
Cambridge.  Yet, because many of the buildings outside Harvard Yard bear no 
obvious indication of affiliation with Harvard, as ever-present as Harvard may be in 
and around Harvard Square, there is often no telling whether any given building is or 
is not part of Harvard College.  Accordingly, the distinction between the Harvard 
College community and its surrounding environs—the distinction giving rise to 
isolation—is, at least in a physical sense, not always clear. 
Even beyond this strictly physical/structural sense of isolation, the distinction 
between College students and non-students, while obvious to some, can still be 
somewhat vague.  As discussed above, the particular homogeneity of the Harvard 
College population—most particularly in age and tastes, but also as a result of 
similar day-to-day activities—Harvard College students are by appearance, though 
surely with exceptions, a relatively distinct community.  Yet, in part because of the 
large number of colleges in Boston, while it may be possible generally to tell college 
students from non-students, to distinguish Harvard College students in particular is 
not always so easy.  In much the same way that Harvard College buildings seem 
omnipresent throughout the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, so too does one get 
the sense that, while surrounded by Harvard College students, it may not be possible 
                                                                
132See RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 128. 
133COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE, supra note 95, at 376. 
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to pick them out with perfect accuracy. In this sense, the non-physical/structural 
isolating features of the Harvard College community fall somewhere between the 
very overt traits of the Amish and the nearly imperceptible identifiers of most RCA 
members.  Significantly, much like the one-way version of isolation found among 
many RCAs (though to far lesser degree), one might suppose that Harvard College 
students have an easier time picking out other Harvard College students than would a 
non-student.134  To summarize, then, it might be said that, in comparison to the 
communities considered above, the isolation of the Harvard College community is 
(1) not as spatially constructed as the Oneida or some of the more secluded RCAs; 
(2) somewhere between the two-way isolation of the Amish, open and obvious to 
outsiders, and the more one-way isolation of the RCAs, whose members’ identities 
(as RCA members) are frequently not identifiable to non-members; and (3) from the 
perspective of the members, more self-contained and broadly life-encompassing (and 
thus probably more identity-creating) than most RCAs. 
5.  Organizational Structure 
Before considering the organizational structure of Harvard College, an important 
distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the relationship between the 
College community considered in this section (the student body) and the governing 
structure, and on the other hand the relationship between the various communities 
considered in the other sections and their respective governing structures.  Where in 
those communities the participating decision-makers are all also members of the 
community, the majority of key decision makers at Harvard College are not members 
of the Harvard College student body.  Though students do have input into the 
decision-making and governing structures and processes, either through formal 
participation135 or through informal advocacy and protest, students are not generally 
the essential players in Harvard College governance.  In some sense this distinction 
does skew somewhat the comparison between Harvard College and the “self-
governed” communities in the previous sections.136  Yet, because accepted students 
                                                                
134This is likely to be true for several reasons.  First, and most simply, students are likely 
to recognize each other from classes, activities or Houses.  Also, it is seems reasonable to 
presume that students will have more familiarity with informal indicators of membership: t-
shirts that hint at membership, particular books, verbal indications of membership, etc 
135The Harvard-Radcliffe Undergraduate Council was established in 1982 “to serve as an 
advocate for student concerns, organize campus-wide social events, and provide funding for 
student organizations.”  HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, HARVARD-
RADCLIFFE UNDERGRADUATE COUNCIL, at  http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/ 
handbooks/student/chapter5/student_government.html (last visited March 1, 2002).  The 
Council is comprised of fifty-one members, some elected by the student body as a whole, 
others from the residential Houses, or from “freshmen districts.”  Id.  The Council is divided 
into three committees: Student Affairs, Campus Life, and Finance.  Id.  Each year, members of 
these committees are selected to participate on the Faculty’s three advisory committees:  the 
Committee on Undergraduate Education, the Committee on House Life, and the Committee on 
College Life. Id. Additionally, the Council is responsible for supervising elections of 
undergraduates to participate in numerous student-faculty standing committees.  Id. 
136Though do recall that some critics have questioned the common conception that 
participation in local governmental decision-making is enhanced by RCAs.  Likewise, 
remember from Section I that while many decisions were made in an egalitarian, democratic 
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have the freedom to choose to become members of the Harvard College community 
(to enroll),137 it is not unreasonable to acknowledge that these students have chosen 
Harvard, at least in a theoretical sense, because they were comfortable with the 
governing structure.  In this sense, though students may not be directly involved in 
the organizational and decision-making structure, it may be presumed that there is no 
less of a link between the Harvard College community and its governance than in the 
other “self-governed” communities. 
That said, what follows is a brief account of Harvard College’s place within the 
University’s organizational structure, as well as a description of the core decision-
making bodies within the College itself.  Harvard College, along with the Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences, comprise the two main sub-bodies of the Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences (FAS).  FAS is the largest of the University’s nine faculties, and is 
under the direct control of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences.  Beyond the 
authority of the Dean, the many functions of FAS are overseen by the President and 
Provost of the University, its two Governing Boards, the Harvard Corporation, and 
the Board of Overseers. 
Within Harvard College, the head administrative official is the Dean of Harvard 
College.  Under his authority, a number of other Associate and Assistant Deans hold 
offices, each with a specified area of responsibility, including oversight of student 
activities, housing, financial aid, service and volunteerism, coeducation, and the like.  
The office of the Dean of Harvard College also has authority over such specific 
offices as the Registrar of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, the Office of Career 
Services, and the Freshman Dean’s Office.  Finally, also under the Dean’s direction 
is the Administrative Board, which implements and enforces academic rules and 
regulations.138  Perhaps with even more direct impact on the daily lives of students, 
after their first year (during which time they are most directly under the purview of 
the Freshman Dean’s Office), they are divided up among thirteen residential Houses.  
Each House is directed by a House Master, an Allston Burr Senior Tutor, and 
numerous resident and non-resident tutors, who together direct the majority of 
student social and extracurricular life. 
                                                          
way, this process was in a sense really only partially democratic, with few community leaders 
making (or at least making recommendations as to) the major decisions. 
137For a number of obvious reasons, this may be something of an overstatement.  First, 
there are many factors besides governing and decision-making structures that, one imagines, 
are more heavily weighted in potential students’ minds when they decide to enroll at Harvard.  
Second, it is quite unlikely that potential students, in deciding whether to enroll at Harvard, 
know anything at all regarding the College’s systems and processes of governance.  Third, 
even with this information, it is doubtful that any other similarly situated college has a system 
of governance that differs from Harvard’s in any meaningful way.  Finally, those students who 
do enroll, only to discover that they are in fact not comfortable with Harvard College 
governance, face numerous barriers (real and perceived) either to transferring to another 
college or dropping out altogether. 
138The Administrative Board will be considered in more detail below. 
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6.  Administrative Board 
The central formal mechanism of social control within the Harvard College 
community is the Administrative Board.139  The Board, created by and deriving its 
authority from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences,  is comprised of two groups: (1) 
teaching faculty and senior administrators; and (2) Senior Tutors and Assistant 
Deans of Freshmen.  Thus, Board membership is split between the “authority 
figures” of the faculty and administration and the more personally familiar 
(significantly, though, non-student) Tutors and Assistant Deans.  Though the Board 
serves numerous purposes, this paper will focus particularly on its responsibility for 
“any undergraduate disciplinary case for which there is governing faculty legislation 
and/or for which there is precedent for interpreting and applying the rules and 
standards of conduct of the College.”140  (Cases for which there is no clear precedent, 
policy, or faculty legislation have recently come under the authority of the Student-
Faculty Judicial Board, which will be discussed below.) 
Once information of transgressive behavior has been brought to the attention of 
the violating student’s resident dean, the procedure of the Administrative Board 
ordinarily begins with an informal conversation between the allegedly deviant 
student and that dean, during which the two will discuss the incident in depth to 
ensure a clear understanding.  Next, the student is asked to prepare a statement to be 
reviewed by the Board, with three goals in mind:  (1) tell the story in full; (2) reflect 
on the event (“[Y]ou should state clearly your understanding of why the actions 
taken were in violation of a rule or standard (if they were)...and what you think about 
the event after time for reflection”); and (3) draw some lessons (“It is important for 
                                                                
139As I pointed out in regard to the devices of social control within RCAs, there are surely 
informal mechanisms—gossip, “peer pressure”, etc.—at work in the Harvard College 
community.  Just as with the RCAs, however, the mere existence of more formal controls, 
here in the form of the Administrative Board, is an indication that the informal social control 
functions within the community are considered (at least by the administration) insufficient.  
Yet, from the perspective of the potential deviant, there is also an additional external informal 
factor at work at Harvard College which is likely absent from the RCA’s.  Adding to a 
student’s equation in deciding whether to deviate—and thus risk punishment, or even 
expulsion—students generally must also consider the often overwhelmingly persuasive force 
of their families.  In comparison, it is doubtful that being made to leave an RCA carries with it 
the same sort of social weight as being expelled from Harvard College.  This additional factor 
may be imagined as added weight in favor of conformity on the potential deviant’s decision-
making scale.  This consideration, as well as the similar factors involved in both the relative 
youth of Harvard College students and the risk of serious future harm that likely comes with 
official sanction or expulsion, will be discussed in more detail in the concluding remarks at the 
end of this paper. 
140See HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
BOARD OF HARVARD COLLEGE, at  http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/ 
chapter4/adboard.html (last visited March 1, 2002).  The Board also focuses its efforts on 
cases of academic review of unsatisfactory records.  While this paper will not consider this 
area of Administrative Board jurisdiction, it should be noted, based on the academic nature of 
the Harvard College community, that such unsatisfactory academic performance (to the extent 
that it falls short of the aspirations of individual community member behavior) is not wholly 
outside the scope of this paper.  Yet, because unsatisfactory academic performance is not 
necessarily deviance per se, in that it does not often threaten the nature of the community, it 
has no useful analogue in the other communities considered above. 
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you to think about . . . how you might behave differently in similar circumstances in 
the future . . . and . . . how this experience has caused you to change or grow.”)141  
FAS materials explain that the latter two goals are set in light of the Board’s 
“interest[ ] in a larger educational view of student behavior.”142 
If, after the initial in-depth conversation and drafting of the student statement, 
formal discipline is thought likely, the student has the right to appear before the 
board when the case is presented.  He or she has the right to have another University 
officer present to serve as personal adviser.  Once at the hearing, the resident dean 
makes a preliminary oral report of his or her findings, after which, the student may 
make opening remarks.  The Board may then question the student, after which the 
student is given a final opportunity to be heard.  When the hearing is concluded, the 
student leaves the room, and the Board begins its deliberations.  Where upon 
deliberation the Board determines that wrongdoing has occurred, and that 
disciplinary action is appropriate, it may choose from five options with increasing 
severity: (1) warn or admonish; (2) disciplinary probation; (3) requirement to 
withdraw for disciplinary reasons (where readmission, after time away from 
Harvard, is likely); (4) dismissal (where readmission, after a time away, is possible, 
though only upon a vote of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences); and (5) expulsion 
(without possibility of readmission).143  Though Board decisions are considered final, 
FAS may review and, if it deems proper, amend any Board decision.144 
“Recognizing that there are some issues that the Administrative Board’s standard 
procedures could not address appropriately,” in 1987, the Faculty established the 
Student-Faculty Judicial Board.145  In taking on such unprecedented cases, then, FAS 
acknowledged that one of the core effects of the Board would be in effect 
establishing community standards on the basis of its decisions.146  With this in mind, 
the Board’s membership is divided equally among six faculty members and six 
students, all selected by lot.147  Yet while this more student-inclusive mechanism is a 
significant symbolic gesture to the merits of having student participation in 
determinations likely to affect community norms and standards, in its thirteen year 
existence, the Student-Faculty Judicial Board has heard but one single case.  
Accordingly, its symbolic significance notwithstanding, further consideration of the 
Board seems unnecessary.  
                                                                
141FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF HARVARD COLLEGE: A 
USER’S GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 6 (2001) [hereinafter USER’S GUIDE]. 
142Id. 
143In the 1999-2000 academic year, of 113 affirmative disciplinary cases brought before 
the Administrative Board, in fourteen cases the Board took no action, sixty-four cases resulted 
in a decision to admonish, twenty-one cases ended in probation, and in fourteen cases the 
student was required to withdraw.  USER’S GUIDE, supra note 141, at 21.  
144Id. at 7. 
145HARVARD UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, THE STUDENT-FACULTY 
JUDICIAL BOARD, at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student/chapter4/ 
adboard.html (last visited March 1, 2002).   
146Id. 
147In addition, “the Dean of [Harvard] College and the Administrative Dean of the 
Graduate School [of Arts and Sciences will serve as] ex officio non-voting members.”  Id. 
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Just as the Harvard College community may be seen, in certain respects, to be a 
synthesis of those features predominant in the Section I communities and those 
predominant in the RCAs, so too may its main social control mechanism—the 
Administrative Board—be considered as such a synthesis of those two communities’ 
respective mechanisms.  In some respects, the Administrative Board is reminiscent 
of the processes utilized by the RCAs.  With its emphasis on procedural safeguards 
and the rights of students—the right to ask that the case be heard by the Faculty-
Student Judicial Board; the right to appear and be heard by the Administrative 
Board; the right to have an advocate present at the hearing; the Board’s following, 
where possible, of prior precedent; the right to appeal the Board’s determination to 
FAS—in certain respects the Harvard College social control function, like that of the 
RCAs, may be described as formal, procedural, and rights-oriented.  To the extent 
that this is the case, it is evidence that, like the RCAs and unlike the Section I 
communities, social control within Harvard College may be considered 
gesellschaftian—its formality, strict procedure, aspirations of neutrality, and minimal 
participation by other members of the community work against the use of or reliance 
on interpersonal, group-first gemeinschaft relations. 
In other respects, however, the Administrative Board seems more similar to the 
processes of the Section I communities.  First, though there is some detailed 
explication of students’ rights, the procedures of the Administrative Board lack the 
full litany of procedural safeguards present in actual litigation:  there is no absolute 
right to present and/or cross-examine witnesses; there is no jury of peers (indeed, 
with the exception of the little-used Student-Faculty Judicial Board, there is no 
participation in the process by fellow-students); there is no absolute right of appeal.  
Second, as mentioned briefly above, of the 113 affirmative cases heard in the 1999-
2000 academic year, only fourteen resulted in a requirement to withdraw, none of 
which were of the variety making readmission anything short of probable.148  In fact, 
more than half the 113 cases resulted in a decision to “admonish,” which, not 
considered a formal disciplinary action, is more a statement to the student and the 
community condemning the student’s actions.  Third, as seen above, in the goals of 
the student statement, the Administrative Board distinguishes itself from a court of 
law in that it not only wishes to determine “guilt” or “innocence,” but also, in line 
with its role within an academic institution, hopes to inspire the deviant student to 
reflect on and learn from his or her transgressions.  Finally, like the Section I 
communities (and unlike the RCAs), the Administrative Board is an internal social 
control mechanism.149  As such, it may create its own precedent, based on the 
collective norms and ideologies of the community.  As particularly seen in the 1987 
decision to establish the Student-Faculty Judicial Board, the Harvard College 
mechanism for social control is one which aspires to make determinations—and 
                                                                
148Of sixty-three Petitions for Readmission heard in the 1999-2000 academic year, only 
six were denied.  USER’S GUIDE, supra note 141, at 21. 
149Where violations of law have occurred, the Administrative Board, though generally 
allowing first for the completion of court proceedings, will nonetheless proceed with the 
Administrative Board hearing, to pursue its own disciplinary determination.  As the User’s 
Guide explains, “The College ordinarily will defer consideration of a case at least for a 
reasonable period of time if a criminal investigation or proceeding is pending in relation to a 
disciplinary case.” Id. at 7. 
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thereby affect future community behavior—in a manner coordinate with and 
informed by the shared norms and values of the community. 
7.  Summary 
I have attempted to show that both the underlying values and aspirations of the 
Harvard College community and its social control mechanisms represent a synthesis 
of the gemeinschaft and the gesellschaft.  Like the dominant characteristics of the 
Section I communities, the Harvard College community is marked by such group-
oriented notions as shared common facilities, living quarters, and services.  For many 
students, like the members of the Oneida Community, Harvard College is a self-
contained and isolated environment.  Likewise, due in part to the homogeneity of 
age, the commonality of pursuits among Harvard students, and the isolation 
engendered by these factors, identity as Harvard College community members is 
likely quite strong.  Perhaps most significantly, as evidenced by many of the official 
statements considered above, the Harvard College community as a whole pursues a 
shared aspiration:  collectively to create an environment in which individuality and 
self-realization may flourish. 
On the other hand, the Harvard College community is in certain respects not 
unlike the generalized account of the RCAs described above.  The instrumental 
benefits of membership in the Harvard Community are likely central factors in many 
potential students’ decisions whether to enroll.  Much like some of the RCAs, while 
the Harvard College community may be for many students a self-contained and 
absorbing environment, students throughout their membership in the community 
maintain close external ties with family and friends outside the community.  
Similarly, the many divisions within the community—on the basis of House 
affiliation, class year, academic concentration, or extracurricular participation—work 
against the creation of the community-wide primary group that characterized the 
Oneida.  Finally, while the ambition for a self-realization-friendly environment may 
be a collective one, to which the community as a whole aspires, the purpose behind 
that collective pursuit is nonetheless of an individualistic nature.  In this sense, it 
may be stated that the shared value at the core of the Harvard College community 
falls somewhere between the group-oriented gemeinschaftian values of Oneidan 
Perfectionism and Amish Gelassenheit, and the gesellschaftian individualism and 
instrumentalism of the RCAs. 
If the previous Sections of this paper have provided any guidance at all, it should 
come as little surprise that, just as the shared values of the Harvard College 
community synthesize the predominant qualities of the Section I communities and 
the RCAs, so too does Harvard’s Administrative Board represent a similar synthesis 
of those communities’ respective social control mechanisms.  The procedures of the 
Administrative Board contain some formal qualities—an explicit, precedent-based 
procedure with numerous safeguards for the rights of students charged with 
violations—found in the RCAs’ external mechanism.  Similarly, the absence of 
student participation on the Administrative Board is far more similar to the external 
procedures of the RCAs than the internal and highly participatory processes of the 
Oneida and Amish.  Yet, at the same time, the Administrative Board is in many 
respects informal.  For example, the Harvard Administration places explicit 
emphasis on the following:  (1) warnings and admonishments; (2) the process’s 
educational possibilities for transgressing students; and (3) through the creation of 
the Student-Faculty Judicial Board, the possible inclusion of students in any 
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determination with likely implications for future perceptions of community 
standards.  Thus, as was shown to be the case in each of the communities considered 
previously, the core values of Harvard College are in a symbiotic relationship with 
the principles and procedures of the community’s social control mechanism.  Just as 
the Administrative Board’s blend of formal and informal qualities, with their mixture 
of individual rights-based and group-based orientations, feeds off the similar mixture 
of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relations within the community, so too is this 
combination of community characteristics and shared values affirmed and reaffirmed 
by the social control function of the Administrative Board.  In short, Harvard 
College, in both its underlying shared values and its mechanisms for social control, 
represents a synthesis of the gemeinschaft and gesellschaft orientations dominant in 
the Section I communities and the RCAs, respectively. 
V.  SECTION IV 
A.  The Dangers And Limits Of Community 
Before concluding, and in light of the numerous instances throughout this paper 
in which I chose to sidestep the issue of the potential dangers of community social 
control to members’ individual rights and integrity, I would like to take this 
opportunity to consider this very important matter.  In considering these dangers, it 
seems most useful to ask the question: What ought to be the role of the state (either 
formally, as government, or informally, as a nation-wide community) in monitoring 
community social control functions of the various types of communities considered 
in this paper?  To make this assessment, we must first try to understand, from the 
viewpoint of the individual member, the natures of the potential dangers present in 
each community, and then balance our responsibility to account for these dangers 
with a need to respect, from the perspective of the group, the unique qualities of the 
communities, and their desires for isolation, insularity, and autonomy. 
From the perspective of concern for individual group members, it seems an 
impossible task to monitor each and every instance of internal social control.  A far 
more reasonable way to approach the issue, then, is to attempt to monitor members’ 
abilities, where they feel they have been deprived of their rights, either to externally 
seek redress or simply leave the community.  In this regard, perhaps the most 
significant risks presented are the barriers to exit discussed on several occasions 
throughout this paper. Where affective, moral and instrumental orientations towards 
the group are strong, it would seem, these ties can create a reliance and dependence 
on the community, its beliefs and its membership, often preventing unhappy or 
dissatisfied members from ever leaving. 
Where affective orientations are strong—where, as was seen among the Oneida, 
ties between members represent most or, perhaps even all, of a member’s 
interpersonal relations—a member considering exit is faced with a wholly unfamiliar 
outside world, with no relations to contact or ask for help.  What is more, where such 
a member has spent his or her entire life in the community, he or she will likely 
(depending on the extent to which the community’s customs, practices and standards 
of behavior deviate from the outside world) have a difficult time interacting with and 
relating to people outside the community.150  Though there are many factors that 
                                                                
150Recall that this concern for child-members born into the community cut to the heart of 
the debate in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  A similar example can be found 
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might contribute within a given community to a heightened (and perhaps potentially 
dangerous) affective orientation, of those considered most carefully in this paper, it 
would seem that the combination of isolation and communalism would have a 
particularly strong effect.  Where members of the community feel a sense of 
interdependence and interconnectedness with each other, and where the community-
circle overlaps with few other community-circles, members are likely to feel 
dependent on membership, and thus less likely to feel capable of exit.  Additionally, 
as was seen in both the Oneida and Amish, where Community boundary-control 
mechanisms rely on informal social pressure—where the ordinarily gesellschaftian 
function of social control is infused with gemeinschaft relations—affective ties, and 
thus affective barriers to exit, are intensified. 
Moral barriers to exit may be understood as a member’s inability to leave the 
community because of a belief, taught and practiced fervently within the community, 
in the community’s moral, ethical or religious superiority.  Where a community 
teaches its members that their own belief system, pattern of behavior, membership or 
way of life is superior to, or at least extremely different from, that of the outside 
world, individual members will, one imagines, be less inclined to leave the 
community, even where they feel they are being treated unfairly or cruelly by the 
community.  For example, the Oneidan notion of Perfectionism, which instilled in 
members a belief that the nature of their community was more amendable to a sin-
free, godly life than the outside world, likely made members’ decisions to exit the 
Community into that corrupt, inferior outside world far more difficult.  Further, as 
was true to an extent with both the Section I communities, where insularity and 
intense isolation are central to a community’s ideology—such that intermingling at 
all with non-members is discouraged or banned—moral barriers are intensified and 
members become increasingly disabled from choosing to exit their communities.151 
The spectrum of barriers that might be considered instrumental is more of a 
catch-all; aside from those barriers affective or moral, it is (1) all of the required 
skills, knowledge, and abilities for a successful existence in mainstream society that 
are not provided, for one reason or another, in a particular community; and (2) the 
detrimental consequences of leaving the community, which, for an individual 
member would militate strongly against exit.  Possible examples of this first sort of 
                                                          
among ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, where very stringent restrictions exist regarding 
interactions between unrelated men and women.  It is not hard to imagine how difficult it 
might be for a person having grown up in such a community to leave the community and be 
able successfully and meaningfully to interact with and relate to people in mainstream society.  
151For example, in many of the RCAs, where there is a sense that the RCA-as-gated-
community is a safe haven from the crime and danger of the outside world, members are 
probably less inclined to venture outside the RCA gates.  Thus, we see that these moral 
barriers can easily lead to and blend into affective barriers as well.  Yet, while insularity is 
often intertwined with the moral/ethical superiority or individuality discussed in the text just 
above, the two are not necessarily the same thing.  For example, a community with a sense of 
moral superiority but without insularity might value proselytizing, which by definition would 
provide contact with non-members.  For an interesting consideration of two ideologically 
fairly similar communities—the Satmar and Lubavitch Hassidic Jews—differing in large part 
on the basis of their opposing views of interaction with outsiders and proselytizing,  see the 
following:  ROBERT EISENBERG, BOYCHIKS IN THE HOOD (1998); ISRAEL RUBIN, SATMAR: AN 
ISLAND IN THE CITY (1972); Stephen Sharot, Hasidim in Modern Society, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS 
ON HASIDISM (Gershon David Hundert ed., 1991). 
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instrumental barriers often stem from differences from mainstream society in 
academic curriculum or discouragement of the use of technology or modern 
communication or transportation.  Thus, a person born into Amish society, having 
little or no knowledge of computers, automobiles and the like, would find life outside 
his or her community far more difficult—and thus would face a much more 
extensive litany of instrumental barriers to exit—than would a person having been 
born into an RCA.  Examples of the second, related type of instrumental barriers 
may be found at Harvard College.  In light of the at least partially instrumental and 
preparatory nature of the community, and the potentially drastic repercussions of exit 
from it, particularly where mandated by the administration as dismissal or expulsion, 
students will perceive a strong instrumental barrier to exit (or any behavior 
jeopardizing their good standing as community members.) 
With respect to the question of the role of the state in monitoring the individual 
rights of community members, two potential instrumental insufficiencies in 
particular deserve additional consideration: (1) the ability of individuals in a 
community to self-monitor their own rights, and whether those rights are being 
respected by the community; and (2) where those rights are not being sufficiently 
respected, their ability to secure external aid in seeking redress.  In both cases, as is 
also likely for most of these barriers generally, there is a connection between the 
presence of these dangers (i.e. inabilities either to self-monitor or to seek redress) 
and intense isolation.  It would seem that where gemeinschaft relations predominate, 
where social pressure is intense, and where community ideology emphasizes 
humility and a group-first mentality (for example, in the Oneida Community), 
individual members would likely be less able or willing to consider the status of their 
own individual rights.  Similarly, to the extent that this sort of social control process 
differs so radically from the more individualistic, formal, procedural, rights-based 
social control processes of mainstream society, even where a members is aware of 
the deprivation of his or her rights, external assistance through the courts, for 
example, may be insurmountably uncomfortable and alienating for the individual.  
Particularly where community members are not made familiar with the origins of 
their rights (the Constitution, Federal law, etc.), or with the processes of the law, the 
dangers of these inabilities are likely to lurk.152  It may be said, then, that the 
presence and degree of these particular inabilities/barriers are likely proportional to 
the degree to which a community’s deviance control processes (1) are informal; (2) 
promote insularity and internal resolution; (3) rely on and perpetuate gemeinschaft 
relations and social pressure; (4) differ in style and format from mainstream 
processes; and (5) rely on and promote a group-first mentality.  It is these five 
considerations, from the perspective of the individual member—affective barriers, 
moral barriers, instrumental barriers, ability to self-monitor, and ability to secure 
external aid in seeking redress—that support state involvement in the monitoring of 
individual rights of members of discrete communities. 
                                                                
152With these considerations in mind, it seems clear that RCAs, which tend to be less 
isolated and to have social control processes not unlike (and indeed relying on) the external 
legal system, pose far less of a danger to the rights of individual members.  This is probably 
also true for the Harvard College community, though, due in part to the youthfulness of 
members and the likely increased level of affective ties and gemeinschaft orientations, 
probably to a somewhat lesser extent. 
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Yet, as the reader has likely recognized in reading this section, it is many of the 
same characteristics here considered as potential dangers that are described in the 
earlier sections with a far more respectful and appreciative tone.  Indeed, where in 
this section various characteristics and orientations are described as “barriers,” in 
previous sections these same qualities are presented as the reasons why people 
decide to become, and to remain as, members.  It is precisely these characteristics 
that communities rely on as the driving force behind their social control processes.  
This is indeed the crux of the issue:  many of the qualities, beliefs, and behaviors that 
make these communities unique, and upon which their very notions and self-
definitions of community and identity rest, are at the same time precisely those held 
up by outsiders as causes for alarm.  Without isolation, the Amish would likely have 
dissolved into mainstream culture; without communalism, the Oneida Community 
would have lost its unique attraction.  Without a common goal or a collective ideal of 
a liberal academic community, RCAs and Harvard College would be without a 
motivating purpose.  And without relying on these characteristics, each respective 
community’s deviance control mechanism would be essentially stripped of its ability 
to reinforce the defining outer boundary of the community-circle.  In short, it is to a 
certain degree the very autonomy and independence from the state that allows 
communities to define themselves, to attract and perpetuate membership, and to 
forge the types of positive affective, moral and instrumental orientations that we 
celebrate as the blessings of community.  The challenge for the state, then, is to 
consider both the needs of communities—to perpetuate their traditions, practices, 
relations and beliefs—and the rights of individual members. 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have now explored four different communities.  We have considered the 
depth of identity formed around the small, isolated, and highly interconnected 
communities in Section I.  And we have examined the more individualistic nature of 
RCAs.  We have compared these two types of communities along two axes:  (1) 
from the perspective of the community as a whole, the relative prominence of 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft  relations; and (2) from the perspective of individual 
group members, the existence of instrumental, affective, and moral orientations 
towards the group.   In both instances, we have found the Section I communities at 
one end of each spectrum and the RCAs on the other.  Further, we have seen how, in 
regards to both of these axes, the Harvard College community is something of a 
synthesis of the Section I communities and the RCAs.  Hopefully, in comparing 
these four quite different forms of community, we have begun to understand what is 
at the core of these community-tubes, drawing people together in commonality. 
We have also seen how each of these communities has a unique device for social 
control, protecting the community and its shared belief, values and/or goals from 
corruption from within and infiltration from without.  From the internal, informal, 
participatory, group-oriented devices found within the Section I communities, to the 
formal, external, rights-based processes of the RCAs, to Harvard College’s synthesis 
of these two extremes, we have seen how a community’s social control mechanisms 
can work to reaffirm and perpetuate the core principles and behaviors at the heart of 
the community.  Thus it is that social control forms a community-tube’s perimeter 
boundary. 
Finally, we have considered the dangers and limits of community.  We have seen 
how, in much the same ways that these communities forge unique identities, attract 
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membership, and control deviance within their communities, they also can 
potentially jeopardize the individual rights and integrity of their members.  Where 
there are strong affective, moral, and instrumental barriers, and where members are 
not sufficiently able either to monitor their own rights or to secure external assistance 
in seeking redress, there is great reason for concern.  Thus it is our responsibility, 
formally as government and informally as a nationwide community bound by a 
collective ideology and national conception of rights, to balance communities’ needs 
for autonomy and independence with community members’ individual rights. 
It has been my contention throughout this paper that a community-tube is the 
result of a symbiotic relationship between two aspects:  it is the core of shared 
values, beliefs, goals, and patterns of behavior, working to inform the perimeter’s 
social control function; at the same time it is the mechanism for social control, 
through its continual definition and redefinition of acceptable values, beliefs and 
behaviors, affirming and reaffirming the commonalities and shared identities that 
form the heart of the community.  Without a core, there is nothing for the outer 
barrier to protect, and without a perimeter there is no boundary to define the outer 
limits of acceptability.  Yet, the mere presence of these two features is not sufficient; 
they must work harmoniously together, each feeding off of each other.  Mutual 
criticism would have disastrous effects in an RCA, and likely even among the 
Amish.  Similarly, contract-based litigation would be destructive if relied on by the 
Oneida Community, or even by Harvard College. 
It may well be true that today’s cross-section out of the community-tube model is 
a more complicated picture than what may have been the case a hundred years ago.  
With global transportation and communication at our fingertips, we are surely less 
isolated than ever before.  We can join chat groups with faceless others on the 
internet, work for global corporations, and maintain personal contacts with friends 
around the world.  If nothing else, our community-tubes are no longer strictly 
geographically defined.  Yet, I do not believe this is an indication of a lack of 
community.  Rather, it is but another step along our ever-evolving conception of 
what community is.  There are an infinite number of possible communities, based on 
an equally infinite variety of underlying shared principles, beliefs and goals, no two 
communities the same and no single one necessarily remaining constant over time.  
Where there is a symbiosis of such commonality at the core, and controlling 
mechanisms at the outer limits, I believe there also exists a tube of community 
possibility. 
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